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ABSTRACT  
THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND ASSET 
PRICING 
by 
Ujjal K. Chatterjee 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Dr. Lilian K. Ng 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays on financial intermediation and asset pricing. In the first 
essay (Chapter 1), I investigate individuals’ consumption-portfolio choices in the presence of 
financial intermediation.  Unlike the existing literature where individuals seamlessly transform 
their savings to productive assets, I show that individuals employ intermediaries and that 
individuals’ consumption growth is a scaled version of intermediaries’ liabilities growth.  As a 
consequence, the growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet variables, such as liabilities and assets, 
determines the stochastic discount factor.  That is, it is shown that the stochastic discount factor 
for asset returns is affine in intermediaries’ balance sheet shocks.  The empirical tests of the 
Euler equation help resolve equity premium and risk-free rates puzzles.  
In the second essay (Chapter 2), I derive an investment-based asset pricing kernel under 
the funding constraints of financial intermediaries. The intermediation-augmented investment-
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based model shows that the stochastic discount factor for asset returns is affine in intermediary 
funding shocks. It is shown that the existing investment-based asset pricing models are a special 
case of a general asset pricing kernel. Intermediation factors, measured by intermediary balance 
sheet shocks, explain size and value premiums and behave as state variables predicting market 
returns. In the cross-section of size, value, and industry portfolios, intermediation factors are 
priced and outperform the existing investment-based and productivity-based factors. Importantly, 
the single-intermediation-factor model performs as well as portfolio-based asset pricing models.    
The third essay (Chapter 3), investigates the relationship between systematic 
intermediation risk and asset market liquidity.  The findings contrast with the existing literature 
that derive firm productivity, and hence stock returns in the absence of financial intermediation.  
I incorporate the theoretical results of the second essay and argue that asset liquidity is a function 
of intermediary balance sheet shocks.  Using intermediaries’ balance sheet data from 1955 to 
2009, the empirical results support the model predictions.  The results further show that the 
observed commonality in stock liquidity can be explained by systematic intermediation risk. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Risk aversion in an intermediary-augmented exchange 
economy  
 
1.1 Introduction 
There are many consumption-based asset pricing models, such as Lucas’s (1978), where identical 
households invest in risky assets without financial intermediation.  For this strand of the 
literature, financial intermediation is exogenous.  Alternatively, there are no frictions 
transferring individuals’ savings to productive assets.  Additionally, the transfer process from 
individuals to productive assets is assumed to be seamless, that is, there is no asset 
transformation delay.  However, intuition tells us that individuals save through financial 
intermediaries, such as banks, in risky assets, such as stocks and that the asset transformation 
(savings to assets) process is not instantaneous.  It is also intuitive that firms borrow from 
intermediaries rather than from individuals because financial intermediaries help reduce 
asymmetric information between borrowers and savers.  It is thus natural to reason that the 
existing consumption-based asset pricing models have shortcomings that need to be addressed.  
The primary contribution of the paper is to show that financial intermediation has equilibrium 
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asset pricing implications.   
 In the model, I relax the assumption that intermediaries are exogenous to individuals’ 
consumption-portfolio choice problem.  In its simplest form, the standard one period initial 
consumption-savings decision into investors’ portfolio choice problem assumes that individuals 
save a portion of their wealth at date 0, and consume a random payoff they receive at date 1.  To 
enjoy the fruit of the dividends in such a pure exchange economy, individuals must employ some 
form of intermediation: at date 0, to invest; at date 1, to receive payoffs.  That is, intermediaries 
are central to the exchange process.  At date 0, what individuals invest is a liability of 
intermediaries.  At date 1, what individuals receive as payoffs is also a liability of 
intermediaries.  Hence, in aggregate individuals’ consumption growth is nothing but a scaled 
version of intermediaries’ liabilities growth.  However, liability is not a standalone variable in 
intermediaries’ balance sheet.  Other balance sheet variables, such as assets, are a function of 
liabilities.  As a direct consequence, I show that the growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet 
variables is mirror-reflections of individuals’ consumption growth, and hence the growth of each 
balance sheet variable determines the pricing kernel.  That is, it is shown that the stochastic 
discount factor for asset returns is defined by intermediary balance sheet shocks.  Importantly, I 
derive the stochastic discount factor under the standard assumption about individuals’ 
preferences where individuals maximize the CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility.  
The economy used to derive the stochastic discount factor is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
For the empirical validation of the intermediary-based Euler equation, I use the growth of 
aggregated balance sheet variables of 17 U.S. intermediaries (with total assets of about 74 $US 
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trillions) as the stochastic discount factor.  I measure β, individuals’ subjective discount rate, and 
γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), at each spot of the transaction process from 
individuals through intermediaries to the marketplace.
1
  While individuals’ consumption is 
persistent, individuals’ savings, measured at the intermediaries’ balance sheet level, is far more 
volatile.  This feature of the intermediary balance sheet data helps evade equity premium and 
risk-free rates puzzles.  This is the primary empirical finding.   
To match equity (stock) market returns, the RRA measured by intermediaries’ assets- or 
liabilities-growth is about 4, which with the time aggregation correction of Breeden, Gibbons, 
and Litzenberger (1989) is about 2, and hence the estimates match the observed risk aversion.  
The results further show that the scaled subjective discount rate measured at the liabilities- or 
assets-side is about 1.03 and the economic interpretations of which are explained in the 
subsequent paragraphs.  The estimates are not significantly different with different sets of test 
assets.   
While the derivation of the intermediation-based Euler equation does not require 
alternative preferences, the model shows that  𝛽′, the subjective discount rate measured at the 
intermediaries’ liabilities-side of the balance sheet is a scaled version of individuals’ subjective 
discount rate, β, which by definition must satisfy the condition 𝛽 < 1.  Specifically, I show 
that 𝛽′ = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑥)−γ , where 𝛽′ is the scaled subjective discount rate measured at intermediaries’ 
liabilities side, x is the scaling factor that measures the fraction of individuals’ consumption that 
are saved through intermediaries, and γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA).  Since 
                                                 
1
 It is argued that 𝛾 may reflect investors’ concerns about not knowing the precise riskiness that they 
confront in the marketplace (see Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003)). 
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intermediaries’ liabilities and assets are highly correlated, measured subjective discount rate by 
the growth of assets inherits the same property.    
The first interpretation of the results that the scaled subjective discount rate measured at 
the liabilities- or assets-side of intermediaries is greater than one revolves around the very notion 
of financial intermediation.  Intermediaries are asset transformers and they transform 
individuals’ savings to productive assets.  Since the transformation process is not instantaneous, 
individuals’ time preference gets modified during the asset transformation process.  Hence, 
 𝛽′ > 1 captures the asset transformation delay.  The stated explanation of  𝛽′ > 1  is thus 
distinct from the explanations of the existing literature (e.g., Kocherlakota (1990), among 
others).   
Second, the scaling factor simply measures the fraction of individuals’ aggregated 
consumption that intermediaries hold.  The estimates show that intermediaries hold about 98% 
of individuals’ total consumption in the economy, that is, about 50% of the total wealth in the 
economy is held by intermediaries.
2
  Thus, the intermediary-based Euler equation has the ability 
to predict the total wealth of the economy. 
Next, I investigate whether conditional consumption growth can match the observed risk 
aversion.  The conditioning variables are described as follows.  In essence, all assets 
intermediaries hold belongs to individuals.  Hence, the growth of intermediaries’ assets or 
liabilities can be interpreted as the growth of individuals’ wealth.  If individuals’ date t 
                                                 
2
 As per the model prediction, the total wealth of the U.S. economy in 2008 should have been 148 US$ trillions 
(2X74), which is closer to the estimated total wealth of 188 US$ trillions from the Federal Flow of Funds. To be 
fair, neither the total wealth of the economy nor intermediaries’ total assets are measured with the absolute 
accuracy. What is important is that about 50% of individuals’ total wealth is held by intermediaries.   
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consumption is dependent upon their wealth growth between dates t-1 and t, that is, if we 
condition consumption by the growth of intermediaries’ assets or liabilities, then the estimates of 
𝛾 by conditional consumption growth are about 2.3  Thus, the estimates match the observed risk 
aversion.  The estimates of β by conditional consumption are about 0.98; that is, the 
conditioning variable, individuals’ wealth, cancel out the asset transformation delay, and hence 
β<1.  Thus, the estimates by conditional consumption growth do not require β>1 and still match 
the observed risk aversion.  The result thus suggests that the conditional consumption growth 
capture the observed preferences of individuals.  While still high, the corresponding implied 
risk-free rates are about 2.5% per quarter, which is far lower than the implied risk-free rates from 
consumption growth.  Thus, the results jointly evade equity premium and risk-free rates 
puzzles.       
Finally, I measure β and γ by the growth of intermediaries’ equity, defined as the 
difference between assets and liabilities, and leverage, defined as the asset to equity ratio.  The 
results show that using equity growth as the stochastic discount factor, the estimates of β are 
about 0.95.  If test assets are a combination of risky and risk-free assets, then the estimated γ is 
slightly negative (-0.56) with equity growth as the stochastic discount factor.  With 
intermediaries’ leverage growth as the stochastic discount factor and a set of risky and risk-free 
assets as test assets, estimated β and γ are about 0.95 and -100 respectively.    
To gain a better understanding of the estimates of β and γ using leverage and equity 
growth, I investigate the relationship between intermediaries’ balance sheet variables.  I show 
                                                 
3
 The wealth effect on consumption is discussed in A ̈t-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2004). 
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that intermediaries’ leverage is procyclical, that is, intermediaries borrow (take leverage) and 
invest more when asset prices are high and vice versa.  Since intermediaries’ borrowings must 
be funded by savings from individuals, individuals who supply intermediaries’ leverage invest 
when asset prices are booming.  Alternatively, individuals who prefer the leverage channel of 
intermediation are highly risk-seekers.  As a consequence, measuring 𝛾 by intermediaries’ 
leverage growth unravels behaviors of individuals who are risk-seekers.  Hence, high negative γ 
(-100) is consistent with this group of individuals.  Since leverages are transformed to assets 
instantly, there are no asset transformation delays.  As a consequence, estimated subjective 
discount rate by intermediaries’ leverage growth is less than one. 
Similarly, measuring 𝛾 and β by intermediaries’ equity growth measures the behavior of 
individuals who invest through the equity channel.  Since individuals who invest through the 
equity channel are not likely to wait for their savings to be transformed to productive assets, 
there are no asset transformation delays, and the estimated β by the growth of intermediaries’ 
equity is less than one.  While the estimated γ by intermediaries’ equity growth is not zero, the 
estimates are close enough to support the perceived notion that intermediaries are risk-neutral.  
At the least, we can safely argue that the equity channel investors are mildly risk-seekers.  
Thus, in contrast to the existing literature where the measurement of individuals’ 
aggregate risk aversion using consumption growth is of prime interest, the intermediary-based 
Euler equation allows for measuring 𝛾 of disparate groups of individuals.  The reason is that if 
we measure 𝛾 by the growth of intermediaries’ liability, then we are measuring 𝛾 of 
representative individuals.  However, if we measure 𝛾 by the growth of intermediaries’ 
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leverage, then we are measuring risk aversion of individuals that are not representative since 
these individuals prefer the leverage channel of intermediation.  Similarly, measuring 𝛾 by 
intermediaries’ equity growth can be interpreted as the measure of risk aversion of investors who 
initiate the intermediation process.     
The economic interpretation or rather application of the model and empirical results are 
regulatory.  He and Krishnamurthy (2012) study the dynamics of risk premia during crises 
where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary.  They find among the three government 
policy choices, such as injecting equity capital, lowering borrowing costs, and buying distressed 
assets, the first policy choice is particularly effective.   
By contrast, the model presented here assumes intermediaries invest on behalf of 
individuals, and the model is not restricted to crises.  Nevertheless, the model allows for 
investigating the efficacy of government policy choices.  It is shown that the equity channel 
investors are possibly risk-neutral, and hence equity capital injection may not have any impact in 
the long-run.  On the other hand, the leverage channel investors are highly risk-seekers and they 
invest when asset prices are high.  As a result, unless asset prices move higher, lowering 
borrowing costs (that is, allowing intermediaries to take on leverage) may not have any impact 
on the economy.  The recent evidences show that intermediaries simply store borrowed funds in 
safer securities rather than lend, that is, lowering borrowing costs may not have any effect on 
kick starting the economy.   
Since the intermediation channel, as evidences in this paper show, is most active when 
asset prices are high, buying distress assets may help ameliorate systemic risk in crises.  
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However, looking beyond crises, buying distress assets is a debatable issue.  First, buying 
distressed asset may not translate to higher asset prices across the board, and second, it has social 
costs.  Thus, we argue that none of the three government policy choices mentioned above have 
long-term effect on the economy unless asset prices move higher.  The recovery from a 
downturn probably has only one solution, and the solution is time.  Eventually, with time on 
their side, economic agents sort things out and asset prices move higher in a definitive manner to 
kick start the next economic cycle. 
This paper is related to the vast literature that endeavors to resolve the equity premium 
puzzle.  The existing resolution relies on introducing alternative measure of consumption (e.g., 
Savov (2011)), new measure of preferences (e.g., Epstein and Jin (1991) and Constantinides 
(1990)), incomplete markets (e.g., Constantinides and Duffie (1996)), rare disasters (e.g., Reitz 
(1988)), and long-run risks (e.g, Bansal and Yaron (2002)).  With the introduction of 
intermediation in individuals’ consumption-savings decisions, I show that a new and different 
measure of scaled consumption sheds light on the puzzle.   
The paper is also related to recent studies that derive asset prices in the presence of 
intermediaries, such as the models of He and Krishnamurthy (2011, 2012) and Brunnermeir and 
Sannikov (2011).  However, these studies do not investigate whether fluctuations of 
intermediaries’ wealth can explain the observed risk aversion.   
Drawing on the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model, Adrian et al. (2012) consider a 
stochastic discount factor for excess returns that is affine in brokers and dealers’ leverage shocks 
and show that brokers and dealers’ leverage is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.  
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However, Johnson (2008) argues that controlling for the aggregate financial position of the 
economy, there should not be any role for the financial position of securities dealers and 
brokerage firms in explaining aggregate fluctuations of overall market liquidity.  We show why 
the stochastic discount factor for asset returns must be derived from the aggregate financial 
position of intermediaries rather than from the funding liquidity of brokers and dealers as in 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).   
In this paper, I show that financial intermediation has equilibrium asset pricing 
implications.  If intermediaries’ balance sheet growth is able to explain the observed preferences 
of individuals, then it must price assets in the cross-section.  It is thus important to investigate 
whether the cross-section of asset returns can be explained by intermediaries’ balance sheet 
variables growth.  I leave this task for future research. 
The essay proceeds as follows.  Section 1.2 derives an intermediary-based asset pricing 
kernel, where individuals save in risky assets through intermediaries.  Section 1.3 tests the 
intermediary-based Euler equation, and Section 1.4 concludes.   
 
 
1.2 The model 
When individuals save, they have several options.  Among other choices, individuals can 
contribute to retirement plans, buy mutual funds from mutual fund companies, buy stocks 
through brokers, purchase annuities through insurance companies, and buy certificate of deposits 
from banks.  Whatever method individuals choose, they use intermediaries’ services.  As a 
10 
 
 
 
consequence, a dollar saved by individuals becomes a dollar of liability to intermediaries.  
Intermediaries as asset transformers convert individuals’ savings to assets, that is, the saved 
dollar is converted to an asset of equal value.  In a future date, when individuals decide to claim 
the assets to meet their consumption needs, they claim intermediary-created-assets from 
intermediaries.  That is, the intermediation process is central to individuals’ consumption-
savings choices, and hence financial intermediation has equilibrium asset pricing implications.   
The setting of the derivation that follows is a frictionless pure exchange economy for two 
dates depicted in Figure 1.1.  The economy has two types of agents: individuals and 
intermediaries who take individuals’ savings and convert these savings to risky assets.  At date 
0, individuals receive endowments and make optimized consumption-savings decisions.  At 
date 0, intermediaries take individuals’ optimal savings as given and maximize their profits at 
date 1 by converting individuals’ savings to assets.  At date 1, intermediaries liquidate assets 
and keep their profits; individuals claim their savings (plus returns on savings) and consume.  It 
is assumed that intermediaries’ compensation is performance-based so that individuals’ and 
intermediaries’ interests are aligned.  Given the setup, first, I derive individuals’ optimal 
consumption-savings decisions.  Next, I derive intermediaries’ profit maximization.  Finally, I 
impose market clearing conditions to derive the intermediary-augmented asset pricing kernel.    
 
1.2.1 Individuals’ consumption-savings decisions  
Individuals make their consumption-savings decisions where they derive utility from consuming 
at the beginning, as well as at the end period.  Followings are the model assumptions that solve 
11 
 
 
 
the optimal consumption-savings problem:  
Model assumptions and setup:  
1) Let 𝑊0 and 𝐶0 be the wealth and consumption at date 0.  At date 1, individuals are 
assumed to consume all their wealth, which is denoted by 𝐶1.  That is, her utility 
function can be written as  U(𝐶0) +  𝛽𝐸[U(𝐶1)] , where  𝛽 < 1 is the subjective 
discount factor that reflects the individuals’ time preference, and E(.) is the 
expectation operator conditional on information at date 0.  
2) There is no labor income. 
3) Individuals choose to invest in n risky assets through intermediaries.  Let 𝑃𝑖, 𝛤𝑖, and 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝛤𝑖 𝑃𝑖⁄  be the price at date 0, payoff and return at date 1 of asset i respectively.  
4) Let 𝑤𝑖 be the portion of date 0 savings invested in asset i.  
5) Individuals are power utility maximizer, i.e., 𝑈(𝐶) = 𝐶1−𝛾 1 − 𝛾⁄ , where γ is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  
Given the setup, 
Date 0 savings are (𝑊0 − 𝐶0) = 𝑥𝐶0        (1) 
where x is the portion of date 0 consumption that is saved for date 1 consumption.  
The intertemporal budget constraint is  𝐶1 = (𝑊0 − 𝐶0)∑  𝑤𝑖 𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1    (2) 
The maximization problem is max𝐶0,{𝑤𝑖} U(𝐶0) +  𝛽𝐸[U(𝐶1)]    (3) 
Since the above maximization problem is standard,
4
 I write the Euler equation as 
1 = E[m01𝑅𝑖]              (4) 
                                                 
4
 See Pennacchi, 2008, pages 80-91 for details. 
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where m01is the stochastic discount factor between date 0 and date 1, and is given by 
 m01 = 𝛽 (
C1
C0
)
−γ
             (5) 
The caveat of the above derivation is that individuals invest in n risky assets through 
intermediaries.  Moreover, individuals’ end-of-period consumption also depends on 
intermediaries.  As a consequence, I next investigate the role of intermediaries in the exchange 
process. 
   
1.2.2 Intermediaries’ profit maximization 
Following Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974), I derive the optimal portfolio 
allocation of intermediaries.  However, unlike the above models, I allow intermediaries to 
interact with individuals.  
Model assumptions and setup:  
1) Intermediaries operate as portfolio managers who hold a mean-variance efficient 
portfolio.  
2) Intermediaries generate profits by borrowing from individuals, keeping a portion of 
borrowed funds as reserves, and the rest are invested in risky assets. 
3) At date 0, 𝑥𝑏
0 is the net borrowing and it costs  ?̃?𝑏 ,  which is random.  
Alternatively, ?̃?𝑏  is the return that individuals expect to receive for postponing their 
consumption. 
4) 𝑥𝑙  is the portion of the borrowed fund that is invested in risky assets, such as 
loans, and it earns random returns 𝑟?̃?.   
13 
 
 
 
5) x𝑅 = (𝑥𝑏
0 − 𝑥𝑙) is the portion of the borrowed fund that is invested in risk-free asset 
that earns returns 𝑅𝑓.   
6) At date 1, intermediaries liquidate the assets they hold.  Intermediaries keep a 
portion as profits, and the rest are returned to individuals. That is, at date 1, 
intermediaries’ liabilities are  𝑥𝑏
1 =  ?̃?𝑏𝑥𝑏
0  and this determines individuals’ end-of-
period consumption. 
Given the setup, intermediaries’ random profits are 
?̃? = r?̃?𝑥𝑙 − 𝑟?̃?𝑥𝑏
0 + 𝑅𝑓𝑥𝑅        (6) 
under the budget constraints 
𝑥𝑅 + 𝑥𝑙 − 𝑥𝑏
0 = 0         (7) 
Note that intermediaries take  𝑥𝑏
0 as given, and they optimally select  𝑥𝑅 and  𝑥𝑙 .  Since 
intermediaries act as mean-variance efficient portfolio managers, they maximize the objective 
function  
Φ(𝑥) = 𝑈{𝐸(?̃?), 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?)}        (8) 
Equation (8) is the standard mean-variance efficient portfolio optimization representation. 
If μ and σ are the expected returns and variance of the portfolio constructed from 
liabilities, reserves, and asset portfolios, and 𝑥∗ = [𝑥𝑙
∗  𝑥𝑅
∗]′ denotes the optimal allocations 
that maximizes Φ, then the first order condition implies 
𝑥∗ = 𝛾𝑉−1𝜌          (9) 
where  
14 
 
 
 
𝛾 =
𝛿𝑈
𝛿𝜇
2(
𝛿𝑈
𝛿𝜎2
)
          (10)   
𝑉 = [
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟?̃?) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟?̃?, 𝑟?̃?)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟?̃?, 𝑟?̃?) 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟?̃?)
]       (11) 
𝜌 = [?̃?𝑏 − 𝑅
𝑓   ?̃?𝑙 − 𝑅
𝑓]′        (12) 
Since the results are standard mean-variance asset allocation solutions,
5
 I do not report 
the derivations.   
The above maximization problem is central to individuals’ consumption-savings 
decisions.  At date 0, individuals decide savings  𝑥𝑏
0 ; at date 1, intermediaries determine 
individuals’ consumption 𝑥𝑏
1 =  ?̃?𝑏𝑥𝑏
0. 
 
1.2.3 Market clearing conditions 
Since there are only two types of agents, the market clearing condition implies that individuals’ 
savings at date 0 must show up as liabilities in the intermediaries’ balance sheet.  Using 
intermediaries’ profit maximization model assumption (3) and equation (1), I write the date 0 
market clearing condition as 
(𝑊0 − 𝐶0) = 𝑥𝐶0 = 𝑥𝑏
0          (13) 
Similarly, the market clearing condition at date 1 implies individuals’ consumption equals 
liabilities of intermediaries.  As a result, using intermediaries’ profit maximization model 
assumption (6), the market clearing condition at date 1 implies 
𝐶1 = 𝑥𝑏
1            (14) 
                                                 
5
 See Freixas and Rochet, 1997, pages 286-289, for details. 
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Plugging 𝐶0 and 𝐶1 and from equations (13) and (14) respectively in equation (5) yields,  
m01 = 𝛽 (
C1
C0
)
−γ
= 𝛽 (
𝑥C1
𝑥C0
)
−γ
= 𝛽′ (
𝑥𝑏
1
𝑥𝑏
0)
−γ
       (15) 
where 𝛽′ = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑥)−γ and it represents the scaled version of the subjective discount factor at the 
liabilities side of intermediaries.    
Since intermediaries’ assets and liabilities are highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficient is about 0.97) and are of the same magnitude, consumption of individuals at date 1 is 
nearly equal to the assets in the intermediaries’ balance sheet.  Under the assumption that the 
exchange process from liabilities to assets is instantaneous, equations (13) and (14) can be 
rewritten as 
𝑥C0 = 𝑥𝑏
0 = 𝐿0 ≈ A0            (16) 
C1 = 𝑥𝑏
1 = 𝐿1 ≈ A1            (17) 
where L and A represent liabilities and assets, the corresponding subscripts denotes dates, and ≈
 denotes that assets and liabilities are nearly equal.  The assumption that assets and liabilities are 
nearly equal is not a necessity, but the assumption is made for notational simplicity. 
Using equations (16) and (17), I restate equation (15) in terms of intermediaries’ liabilities as  
m01 = 𝛽
′ (
L1
L0
)
−γ
              (18) 
The above could be written in terms of intermediaries’ assets as  
m01 = 𝛽
′ (
L1
L0
)
−γ
= 𝛽′′ (
A1
A0
)
−γ
            (19) 
where 𝛽′′ = 𝛽′ ∗ (
L1
L0
A1
A0
⁄ )−γ captures the scaling of liabilities to represent the asset growth, and it 
represents the scaled version of the subjective discount factor at the terminal transaction process 
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at the marketplace.  Ex ante, it could be argued that 𝛽′′ ≈ 𝛽′, since 𝐿1 ≈ A1 and 𝐿0 ≈ A0.       
What I show above is that the stochastic discount factor is defined by intermediaries’ 
balance sheet variables shocks.  The stochastic discount factor can also be expressed in terms of 
other balance sheet variables, such as leverage, but I skip those derivations to save space.   
The primary testable implication of the above derivations is the Euler equations (4).  In 
this paper, I focus on estimating β and γ.  However, as opposed to using the standard stochastic 
factor defined by consumption growth as in equation (5), I use alternative specification for the 
stochastic discount factor defined by intermediaries’ liabilities and assets growth as in equations 
(18) and (19) respectively.  Since intermediaries’ liability or assets are functions of other 
balance sheet variables, I also have specification where the stochastic discount factor is defined 
by intermediaries’ equity and leverage growth.  The last two specifications allows for 
investigating the relationship between asset prices and intermediaries’ equity and leverage.       
Hence I consider the following variables: the growth of a) assets, b) liabilities, c) equity, 
and d) leverage, where  equity = (asset − liability) and  leverage = (asset equity).⁄   The 
intermediation variables are described in the Appendix A.  The Appendix A also describes the 
data needed to test the Euler equation along with their sources.   
Depending on the test specification, following are the test assets: a) the equity premium 
(𝑅 ), which is value-weighted CRSP stock returns less T-bill returns, b) value-weighted CRSP 
stock returns (MKT), c) T-bill returns (𝑅𝑓), d) excess returns on the 25 Fama-French (1993) size 
and book-to-market portfolios, 10-year Treasury, Moody’s Aaa and Baa bonds, and e) returns on 
the 25 Fama-French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios (FF25). 
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1.3 Main Empirical Results 
The important feature of the aggregated intermediation data is that the growth of aggregated 
balance sheet variables is more volatile and is highly correlated with stocks.  This feature of the 
data allows intermediaries balance sheet variables to fit the equity premium with the robust 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) estimates that ranges from 4.25 when intermediaries’ 
assets are used for the estimation.  The estimate of RRA by the growth of liabilities is of the 
same order. 
 With the realistic assumption that individuals’ consumption is contingent upon their 
wealth, that is, conditioning consumption with the intermediaries’ assets or liabilities growth, the 
estimates are closer to the observed risk aversion.  
 
1.3.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1.1 Panel A compares the distribution of the quarterly consumption growth versus the 
quarterly aggregated balance sheet variables growth.  All balance sheet variables are about 30 
times more volatile than consumption.  Except for the growth of equity, the correlation between 
the growth of other balance sheet variables and market excess returns (return on value-weighted 
CRSP stocks minus risk-free returns) is above 60%, which is about four times as high as that for 
consumption.  While the correlation between the leverage growth and consumption growth is 
about 7%, the correlation between consumption and other balance sheet variables are about 20%.  
Thus, the correlation analysis conforms to the theoretical prediction that consumption growth 
and the intermediaries’ balance sheet growth move in unison.    
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Consumption and intermediaries’ balance sheet variables also differ in persistence.  
Table 1.1 Panel B reports the autocorrelation structure for all variables of interests.  The table 
shows that consumption, leverage, and equity growth have first and higher orders statistically 
significant autocorrelation, whereas the asset and liability growth are neither persistent nor 
random. While a first order autocorrelation is absent for the asset and liability growth, they have 
statistically significant second-order autocorrelation.  The asset and liability growth seem to 
follow a pulsating wave pattern where pulses come in every second and fourth quarter.  To 
account for potential time aggregation, I report corrected risk aversion estimates following 
Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989). 
Figure 2 provides a graphical comparison of the intermediation and consumption data.  
The plot shows that intermediaries’ asset growth is far more volatile than consumption and the 
pattern is consistent throughout the whole 1955-2009 sample.  Consumption growth declines at 
the onset of a recession and picks up sharply towards the end.  By contrast, except for the recent 
recession, the asset growth fluctuates within the recession period.  
 
1.3.2 Estimates of risk aversion and the equity premium  
The strong positive correlation between intermediaries’ balance sheet variables growth and the 
stock market returns, and the positive correlation between the balance sheet variables growth and 
consumption imply that returns on stocks present consumption risk.   
I now formally test the Euler equation (4) and estimate 𝛾 to ascertain the observation.  
Following Hansen and Singleton’s (1982), among others, using equations (4), (5), (18), and (19) 
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I write the general multi-period
6
 version of the Euler equation as 
E [𝛽 (
Xt+1
Xt
)
−γ
𝑅𝑡+1
 ] = 0             (20) 
where 𝑅𝑡+1
 is the excess returns on risky assets over the T-bill return, X represents either 
consumption or any one of the intermediation variables.  I have also assumed that 𝛽 = 𝛽′ = 𝛽′′ 
in equation (20) for notational simplicity.  Every variable in equation (20) is observable 
excluding β and 𝛾.   
Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that the estimates of 
the coefficient of risk aversion γ obtained with the consumption data are too high from an 
economic perspective.  Weil (1989) further shows that high risk aversion estimates translates to 
very high implied unconditional risk-free rates.  The high estimates of γ are a direct 
consequence of low volatility of the consumption data.  To satisfy the Euler equation, low 
volatility consumption data and high estimated γ is needed to match stock returns.  That is, the 
equity premium puzzle is the direct consequence of smooth consumption data.  A new measure 
of consumption from what individuals save through intermediaries directly addresses the puzzle.           
To match the quarterly equity premium (𝑅 ), which is value-weighted CRSP stock returns 
(𝑅 ) returns less T-bill returns of 1.55 % in the sample, calibrated γ and β are presented in Table 
1.2. 
Following Mehra (2003), the simulation results in Table 1.2 assume 𝛽 = 0.99 for the 
estimation of γ using consumption growth.  I assumed 𝛽 = 1.04 for the estimation of γ using 
                                                 
6
 The formal derivation in a multi-period setup does not bring additional insight to the understanding of the 
exchange process, and hence I skip the derivation for simplicity.  
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intermediaries’ asset and liabilities growth.  The rationale for which is discussed in the 
subsequent sections.  
The results with consumption growth highlight the equity-premium and risk-free-rates 
puzzles, and estimates of γ and β are similar to Mehra’s (2003) results.  The results with asset 
and liabilities growth as stochastic discount factors solve the equity-premium puzzle.  Looking 
at the implied risk-free returns, the estimates
7
 are about 1.5% per quarter, which is far higher 
than historical data, that is, the risk-free rate puzzle holds.  Next, I investigate economic 
interpretations of 𝛽 > 1.  
While the calibrated β with the asset or liabilities growth is greater than one, it is 
consistent with equation (15), where it is shown that the β measured at the asset or liabilities side 
of intermediaries’ balance sheet is a scaled version of the actual β.  While literature (for 
example, Kocherlakota, 1990) provides a unique perspective on point estimates of 𝛽 > 1, I 
provide an alternative perspective.  
The primary role of intermediaries is to transform assets: individuals’ savings to 
productive assets.  Neither is the transfer of individuals’ savings to productive assets costless 
nor is the conversion process instantaneous.  There exists a time delay.  Hence,   𝛽′ >
1 captures the time delay at the liabilities side.  This allows for individuals to have a time 
preference 𝛽 < 1, but they do anticipate the delay transferring their savings to productive assets.  
When individuals claim their assets, intermediaries need to liquidate the assets they hold, and the 
asset liquidation process may not be instantaneous.  The delay in liquidating assets is also 
                                                 
7
 The implied unconditional risk-free rate is 𝑅𝑓 = [𝛽(𝐶𝑡+1 𝐶𝑡)⁄
−𝛾]−1.  A log-normal approximation 
yields ln (𝑅𝑓) = −ln(𝛽) + 𝛾𝐸[ln(𝐶𝑡+1 𝐶𝑡)⁄ ] − 0.5𝛾
2var[ ln (𝐶𝑡+1 𝐶𝑡)⁄ ]. 
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captured in  𝛽′′ > 1.         
Additionally, recall that the scaled discount rate at the liabilities side of the 
intermediaries’ balance sheet is  𝛽′ = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑥)−γ.   With 𝛽 = 0.99,  𝛽′ = 1.04 and  𝛾 =
2.57, parameter estimates by liabilities growth respectively, implies that  𝑥 ≈ 0.98 .  Using 
equation (9), the interpretation is that about 50% of agents’ aggregated wealth shows up as 
liabilities or assets in the intermediaries’ balance sheet.  In the sample, total assets of 
intermediaries is 74 US$ trillions, and this translates to total assets of the U.S. economy to be 
148 US$ trillions.  Given that neither the sample selection of this paper nor the estimate of total 
assets is exhaustive, the estimate of total assets in the economy
8
 by intermediaries’ balance sheet 
using the Euler equation is strikingly close.   
In Figure 1.3, I show the sensitivity of γ with β. For the plots I have restricted β to be less 
than one for the γ estimates with consumption data following the bound imposed by the theory.  
As for the RRA estimates, I do not pose any restriction on β since economic interpretations of 
which is explained earlier. Figure 3A shows that RRA estimates with consumption growth are 
more sensitive to the variations in β.  Figure 1.3B shows that the RRA estimates with assets and 
liabilities growth are similar in magnitude.   
The plots clearly show that the measured RRA with assets or liabilities growth are 
relatively stable when β>1 and estimated RRA is well within the range of observed risk aversion.   
 
                                                 
8
 As of December 2008, Rutledge Capital estimates (from the Federal flow of funds data) total assets to be 188 US$ 
trillions (See details at:  http://rutledgecapital.com/2009/05/24/total-assets-of-the-us-economy-188-trillion-
134xgdp/).   
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1.3.2.1 Dynamic estimates of risk aversion  
I next estimate RRA (γ) with Equation (21), where the subjective discount rate is pinned down at 
0.95 following Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008) and Savov (2011), among others.  This allows 
for comparing the results in this paper with the latest literature. 
E [𝛽 (
Xt+1
Xt
)
−γ
𝑅𝑡+1
 ⨂𝑍𝑡] = 0            (21) 
where 𝑅𝑡+1
 is the excess returns on risky assets over the T-bill return, X represents either 
consumption or any one of the intermediation variables, and 𝑍𝑡 is the information set at time t.   
Savov (2011) shows that garbage production as a measure of consumption matches the 
U.S. equity premium with the RRA estimate of 17.  Additionally, garbage as a measure of 
consumption outperforms NIPA expenditure consumption, the Q4-Q4 measure that uses the 
fourth-quarter year-over-year growth in expenditure (Jagannathan and Wang (2007)) and the 
long run P-J measure that uses three-year consumption growth (Parker and Julliard (2005)) in 
estimating the RRA.   
Table 1.3 Panel A presents the results of an Iterated GMM test of the Euler equation, 
where I use the equity premium as the test asset.  As for the stochastic discount factor, I use the 
growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet variables that are described earlier and consumption 
growth.  Additionally, I have included the growth of followings two variables: 
a) 𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1)⁄ , consumption scaled by 
intermediaries’ asset growth 
b) 𝑐𝑙𝑔𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ (𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑡−1)⁄ , consumption scaled by 
intermediaries’ liabilities growth.   
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These two variables represent the intuition that consumption is contingent upon 
individuals’ wealth,9 which I proxy for by intermediaries’ assets or liabilities growth.  I 
use the following instruments: the lagged asset, liability, equity, and leverage growth, 
lagged consumption growth, lagged cay, consumption to wealth ratio from Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001), and lagged price to dividend ratio.  The usage of the last four 
instruments is common in the literature (Savov (2011)).   
Looking at the first column, the estimated RRA with consumption growth is 169, which 
is far too high to reconcile with the observed risk aversion.  By contrast, the estimates of RRA 
using the intermediation factors are far lower.  While still large, the estimates of RRA with 
leverage, cag, and clg are about 15, which is about the same as the reported RRAs using garbage 
as a proxy for consumption (Savov (2011)).  Following A ̈t-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2004) 
and Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1985), the time aggregation correction yields the 
estimates of RRA that is half the size of the unadjusted estimates.    
Looking at the implied risk-free rates, the estimates cannot be economically reconciled. 
For consumption growth, the implied risk-free rate is about 72% per quarter.  By contrast, with 
intermediaries’ balance sheet growth, while still huge, the estimates of the implied risk-free rate 
are about 8% per quarter are far lower than that measured by consumption. 
Following literature (Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2010)), I use excess returns on the 
25 Fama-French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios (FF25) as a first set of test assets.  
To enhance the power to the tests, I use several bond returns with FF25 as test assets.  The bond 
                                                 
9
 Correlations between clg and cag with cay, the consumption to wealth ratio of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) are 
0.00314 and 0.00228 respectively.  Hence, they are unrelated since the wealth measured in this paper is 
different.  I thank an anonymous seminar participant at Universitat Pompeu Fabra for raising the question.   
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returns are T-bill returns as risk-free asset returns, excess returns on 10-year Treasuries, and 
excess returns on Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate bonds.  None of these specifications have 
any instrument to address Ferson and Foerster’s (1994) criticism that GMM estimates with too 
many instruments and moment conditions may be biased.   
In Table 1.3 Panel B, I show that by having diversified test assets, the estimated of RRA 
using clg and cag remains practically unchanged.  For parsimony, the estimates by other 
intermediation variables are not reported since the estimated RRAs are not as robust.  The 
stability of the RRA estimates with diversified test asset shows the importance of both clg and 
cag.  Note these two variables measure conditional consumption, where the conditioning 
variables are individuals’ wealth growth.  Thus, the results suggest that the specified 
conditional consumption best captures individuals’ risk preference.   
The implied-risk free rate with excess returns of FF25 is about 8% per quarter and is still 
too high.  Estimating the implied risk-free rates with risk-free assets as test assets is 
counterintuitive; hence, throughout the paper implied risk-free rates are not reported for any 
combination of test assets that has risk-free assets as one of the test assets.     
In summary, the estimates of γ by the growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet variables 
are far better than the estimates by consumption growth.  To match the equity premium, 
conditional consumption, where the conditioning variables are measured by intermediaries’ asset 
or liabilities’ growth, match the estimates of γ by garbage growth. 
The caveat with the above estimation methodology is that it is assumed that the 
subjective discount rate (β) is constant.  I next relax the assumption and estimate β directly.  
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1.3.3. The risk aversion and subjective discount rate estimates  
Equations (15) and (19) show that the subjective discount rate measured at the liability or asset 
side of the balance sheet is a scaled version of individuals’ subjective discount rate (β).  Hence, 
pinning down β to 0.95, as was done in the previous sub-section, may not be proper for the 
present study.  Hence, I estimate β and show that the scaled β measured at the liability or asset 
side of intermediaries’ balance sheet has important economic significances.  I use the following 
specification of the Euler equation, which is similar to the specification of Ferson and Harvey 
(1992), among others.   
E [𝛽 (
Xt+1
Xt
)
−γ
𝑅𝑡+1⨂𝑍𝑡] = 1            (21) 
where 𝑅𝑡+1is the return on any asset, and the rest of the variables are same as equation 
(20).   
The primary reason for using equation (21) is as follows.  One needs to make strong 
assumptions regarding the joint properties of two stochastic equations of the form (21) (one for a 
risky asset and the other for the risk-free asset) to derive equation (20).  The existing literature 
(and the results of this paper) show that such strong assumptions leads to economically 
implausible estimates of γ.  As a direct consequence, the implied unconditional risk-free rates 
are orders of magnitude too high.  In essence, any study that uses equation (21) may not be able 
to estimate β and γ that has any economic interpretation.  For example, Cochrane (1996) 
estimates β and γ to be 1.29 and 116 respectively for consumption growth scaled by the constant, 
term spread, and dividend-to-price ratio using an iterated GMM procedure.   
Table 1.4 presents the results where intermediaries’ asset and liabilities are used to test the 
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Euler equation.  Looking from the left, first two columns present the estimates of γ and β with 
MKT as test assets with the instruments mentioned earlier.  The estimates of γ and β using the 
asset or liability growth are of the same order, and are about 4 and 1.03 respectively, and the 
estimates are similar to the calibrated results provided in Section 3.2.  With the time 
aggregation correction of Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989), the estimates of γ is about 
2, and hence match the observed risk aversion. 
The results further demonstrate that 𝛽′ and 𝛽′′of equations (15) and (19) respectively are 
almost identical since liabilities and assets are highly correlated.   
Looking next at the implied risk-free rates, with MKT as the test asset, while still large, 
the estimates are 1.28%, 1.38%, and 1.26 % per quarter, for the asset, liability and consumption 
growth respectively.  Thus, the liability or asset growth simultaneously evades the equity 
premium and risk-free rates puzzles.   
With FF 25 as test assets, the risk-free rates estimates are about 3% per quarter, thus the 
risk-free-rates puzzle holds when test assets are diversifies risky assets. 
Next, turning to Table 1.5, where cag and clg, the conditional consumption growth, are 
used to estimate γ and β.  The test assets and instruments are the same as before.  Looking at 
the first two columns, strikingly, the estimates of γ are about 2 and are similar to the observed 
risk aversion.  The estimates of β are about 0.98.  Hence, the estimates do not require β>1 and 
still match the observed risk aversion.  Thus, the results show why both cag and clg were able 
to explain the equity premium with the lowest estimate of γ under restrictive tests of the Euler 
equation (see Table 1.3).  Thus, the conditional consumption growth basically captures 
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individuals’ preferences.       
In each subsequent estimates, I have used 𝛽 = 0.977, and the results show that while the 
estimates of γ using cag and clg are nearly insensitive to test assets, the estimates of γ by 
consumption vary by a large margin with diversified test assets.  Finally, none of the estimates 
of implied risk-free rates are economically plausible.   
 
1.3.3.1 Intermediaries’ Equity and Leverage 
In this section, I estimate γ using intermediaries’ equity and leverage growth and investigate the 
economic implications of the estimated γ.  To appreciate the dynamics of equity and leverage, I 
first show the evolution of intermediaries’ balance sheet variables with the business cycle.  
Next, I estimate γ using the growth of intermediaries’ equity and leverage. 
Adrian and Shin (2010) discuss the relationship between intermediaries’ equity and 
leverage and its implication on intermediaries’ balance sheet.   They show commercial banks 
maintain a preset leverage and investment banks’ leverage is pro-cyclical.   As asset prices rise, 
intermediaries’ equity rises, thereby lowering their leverage.  Commercial banks respond to 
falling leverage by expanding the balance sheet by borrowing and lending more to attain the 
desired leverage.  The effect of asset prices on investment banks is far more pronounced since 
their leverage is pro-cyclical.  Investment banks borrow and lend more than commercial banks 
and their leverage keep rising with the rising asset prices until an asset bubble sets in.       
In Figure 1.4, I show that intermediaries’ leverage in aggregate is pro-cyclical.  In the 
scatter plot shows the relationship between intermediaries’ asset and leverage growths.  Since 
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the slope of the regression line is positive, intermediaries’ leverage is pro-cyclical.   
As a direct consequence, in economic expansions when asset prices are high 
intermediaries expand the balance sheet.  In recessions, however, intermediaries contract the 
balance sheet by borrowing and lending less. 
Since intermediaries’ borrowings must be funded by savings from individuals, individuals 
who supply the leverage pursue booming asset prices.  Alternatively, individuals who prefer the 
leverage channel do not postpone their consumption at all times; these individuals save when 
asset prices are high and they consume when asset prices are low.  Hence, individuals who 
prefer the leverage channel are not representative investors.  Thus, measured 𝛾 by 
intermediaries’ leverage growth is different from measured 𝛾 by the growth of asset or liabilities.  
As a consequence, measuring 𝛾 by intermediaries’ leverage and equity unravels behaviors of 
disparate groups of individuals.       
Having discussed the balance sheet dynamics, I estimate γ using the equity and leverage 
growth.  Table 1.6 presents the results, where the test assets and instruments are the same as 
before. 
 Looking from the left, where stock returns and instruments are used, the results show that 
the estimate of RRA by the equity growth is negative.  Since intermediaries’ equity must come 
from individuals, the RRA estimates indicate that individuals who invest through the equity 
channel are risk-seekers.  Alternatively, these individuals would invest when the risky asset 
returns are high.  While the estimates remain negative irrespective of the test assets, the 
estimated γ of -0.56 with stock market and T-bill returns as test assets suggests that equity 
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investors are possibly risk-neutral.   
Note that whether it is equity or leverage, funds must come from individuals, and hence 
the measured preference by equity is the preference of individuals who are entrepreneurs.  As 
opposed to the estimated β by asset or liabilities growth, the estimated β of 0.95 by equity growth 
confirms that there is no time delay channeling equity to productive assets.   
 By contrast, we observe that when test assets are stock market returns or FF25 returns, 
the estimated γ by leverage is about 4 and 1.34 respectively.  However, when T-bill returns are 
an additional asset to stock market returns, we observe that γ is about -104.  That is, individuals 
that invest through the leverage channel when confronted with the choices between risky assets 
and a risk-free asset, they prefer risky assets.  Unreported results show when T-bill returns are 
added to FF25 returns as test assets, the estimated γ is -113.861.  Such a strong preference for 
risk has important economic implications.  In economic expansions with the boom in the asset 
prices, individuals that invest through the leverage channel lever up, which leads to asset 
bubbles.  In economic contractions when asset prices are low, these individuals simply sit idle. 
He and Krishnamurthy (2012) investigate three government policy choices during crises, 
such as injecting equity capital, lowering borrowing costs, and buying distressed assets and they 
find injecting equity capital is effective.  By contrast, the results presented here allow for 
investigating the efficacy of government policy choices in economic recoveries.  For the 
discussion below, I consider the marginal investor is a financial intermediary as in He and 
Krishnamurthy (2012).   
Since the intermediation channel, specifically the leverage channel, is most active when 
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asset prices are high, intermediaries as marginal investors have no incentive to invest in risky 
assets if asset prices are low.  As a result, lowering borrowing costs (that is, allowing 
intermediaries to take on leverage) may not have any impact on the economy if asset prices are 
low: intermediaries would simply borrow at a lower cost and hold borrowed funds in safer 
securities rather than lend.  Buying distress assets may help ameliorate systemic risk in crises.  
However, looking beyond crises, buying distress assets is a debatable issue.  First, buying some 
distressed asset may not translate to higher asset prices across the board, and second, it has social 
costs.  Importantly, buying distressed asset may actually hurt asset prices, because it may act as 
a negative signal.  Injecting capital may be required in crisis, but capital injection has no effect 
on economic recoveries since intermediaries’ capital constraints are not an issue as long as asset 
prices, albeit at a lower level after recessions, are stable.  Simply put, none of the policy 
measures discussed above may translate to an economic recovery.  With time, economic agents 
sort things out and asset prices rebound in a definitive manner to kick start the next economic 
cycle. 
 
1.4 Conclusions 
In this paper, I show that the stochastic discount factor is defined by intermediaries’ balance 
sheet variables shocks.  Importantly, the stochastic discount factors are derived under the 
standard assumption about individuals’ preferences.  
Since the publication of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) paper, academicians attempted to 
reconcile observations with theory to resolve the puzzle using a plethora of measurements of 
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preferences, alternative measure of consumption, incomplete markets, rare disasters, and long-
run risks.  In contrast, I show that individuals save through intermediaries. As a direct 
consequence, individuals’ consumption growth is a scaled version of the growth of 
intermediaries’ balance sheet variables.  By measuring the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
by the growth of balance sheet variables of intermediaries evades the equity premium puzzle.  
The results further show the differences in individuals’ preferences as they employ financial 
intermediaries.   
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Appendix 1.A. Data  
The quarterly-sample under investigation dates from the first quarter of 1951 through the fourth 
quarter of 2009.  Unless noted otherwise, all data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.  I collect intermediaries’ balance-sheet data from the Federal Flow of Funds for 
16 intermediaries that are grouped into six different categories based on their mode of operations.  
It is worth mentioning that balance-sheet data at the Federal Flow of Funds are reported at the 
subsidiary level, and hence any possibility of double counting the balance-sheet information is 
minimized.  This information is important for our subsequent analysis.  I obtain Fama-French 
factors, size and book-to-market and industry portfolios, and risk free (T-bills) rates data from 
Ken French’s website.  The data for cay, the consumption to wealth ratio of Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001) and consumption is obtained from Martin Lettau’s website.  I obtain the 
dividend to price ratio data from Robert J. Shiller’s website.  For all intermediaries’ data, 
several data points are missing, and I get consistent data from the first quarter of 1951.  I also 
discard data from 1951 to 1954 to account for the initial data reporting errors.  As a result, the 
sample is from 1955 through 2009.  All data is adjusted from inflation. 
Following Adrian and Shin (2009), I include 17 intermediaries to proxy for the U.S. 
financial intermediation, and intermediaries are grouped into six categories: banks, mutual funds, 
pension funds, insurance companies, securities brokers & dealers, and shadow-banks
10
.  Table 
A.1 presents the descriptive statistics for these intermediaries.  For the subsequent analysis, I 
aggregate assets and liabilities of these intermediaries.  I measure the equity as assets-liabilities 
and leverage as assets divided by equity.  The growth of balance-sheet variables are the 
intermediation factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, Boesky, “Shadow Banking”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Report #458, 
2010. 
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Table 1.1 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics.  Panel A presents sample moments for the growth of consumption, assets, 
liabilities, Equity = (Assets − Liabilities), and leverage defined as Leverage = (Assets) (Assets − Liabilities)⁄ .  
The correlation of each variable with the equity premium (𝑅 ), which is value-weighted CRSP stock returns (𝑅 ) 
returns less T-bill returns is shown just below the sample moments.  Pearson correlations are presented right after 
that.  Panel B presents the auto-correlation structure of the variables described.  P-values are in the parenthesis.  
Sample 1955:Q1-2009:Q4.  
 
 
Panel A: Sample Moments 
 
Consumption Asset Liability Equity Leverage 𝑅  
       Mean 1.004 1.022 1.023 1.020 1.002 0.015 
Std. dev. (X100) 0.478 1.353 1.599 1.309 1.173 8.400 
Corr. (𝑅 )  0.153 0.614 0.705 0.052 0.636 
 
 
(0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.445) (0.000) 
 
       Consumption 0.255 0.231 0.192 0.074 
 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.274) 
 Asset 
  
0.967 0.592 0.478 
 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Liability 
   
0.377 0.675 
 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
 Equity 
   
-0.425 
           (0.000)   
 
 
Panel B: Auto-correlation Structure 
  
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 
       Consumption 0.310 0.154 0.224 -0.008 -0.153 
  
(0.000) (0.032) (0.002) (0.912) (0.026) 
Asset 
 
0.072 0.215 0.049 0.257 -0.058 
  
(0.296) (0.002) (0.476) (0.000) (0.411) 
Liability 
 
0.104 0.189 0.058 0.177 -0.050 
  
(0.136) (0.007) (0.404) (0.012) (0.491) 
Equity 0.241 0.171 -0.153 0.423 -0.088 
  
(0.001) (0.009) (0.024) (0.000) (0.234) 
Leverage 
 
0.232 0.120 0.002 0.067 -0.082 
    (0.001) (0.095) (0.976) (0.375) (0.305) 
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Table 1.2 
Static estimates of relative risk aversion with the equity premium  
This table presents calibrated results for RRA and DF using the Euler Equation to match the quarterly equity 
premium (𝑅 ) of 1.55% following Mehra (2003).  RRA (𝛾) is the relative risk aversion coefficient and DF (β) is the 
subjective discount factor. 
 
Calibrated RRA (𝛾) and DF (β) to match the Equity Premium 
    Consumption Asset Liability 
     RRA (𝛾) 
 
15.50 2.56 2.57 
DF (β) 
 
0.99 1.04 1.04 
Implied 𝑅𝑓/Quarter 1.51 1.54 1.54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 
The equity premium and estimates of relative risk aversion 
This table presents relative risk aversion estimates.  The moment conditions are  
E [𝛽 (
Xt+1
Xt
)
−γ
𝑅𝑡+1
 ⨂𝑧𝑡] = 0  
Xs are: Consumption, intermediaries’ Asset and Liability.  RRA (𝛾) is the estimated relative risk aversion 
coefficient. GMM p-values are in the parenthesis.  The first estimate of RRA is from the above moment condition, 
and the adjusted estimate corrects for the time aggregation by a factor of ½ following Breeden, Gibbons, and 
Litzenberger (1989).  Implied 𝑅𝑓  is based on the estimated risk aversion. The pricing errors are the root mean 
squared errors.  First three columns present the results with the equity premium as the test asset 
with 𝑧𝑡 instruments; the instruments are the lagged asset, liability, equity, and leverage growth, lagged consumption 
growth, lagged cay, consumption to wealth ratio from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and lagged price to dividend 
ratio.  Next, the estimates of RRA with the risk-premium and risk-free returns are presented without instruments.  
Following Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008) the subjective discount factor is pinned down at 0.95. 
 
Iterated GMM estimates of RRA (𝛾) with β =0.95 
Test Assets Equity Premium & Instruments 
  
Consumption Asset Liability Equity Leverage cag clg 
         RRA (𝛾) 
 
168.841 42.827 32.229 45.770 13.893 15.625 14.732 
S.E. 
 
44.909 9.133 6.796 14.357 8.082 6.795 5.784 
Adjusted RRA (𝛾) 84.421 21.413 16.114 22.885 6.946 7.812 7.366 
Implied 𝑅𝑓/Quarter 72.396 44.026 38.875 29.938 -6.448 8.073 6.965 
Pricing Error 4.816 5.215 5.425 5.588 7.588 6.309 6.361 
P-Value   0.797 0.665 0.638 0.720 0.544 0.415 0.425 
 
 
Panel B:  Iterated GMM estimates of RRA (𝛾) with β =0.95 
Test Assets 
Excess Returns 
on FF25 
Excess Returns on FF25 & 
𝑅𝑓 
Excess returns on FF 25, 10-yr Treasury, 
AAA, BAA bonds, & 𝑅𝑓 
  
cag clg cag clg cag clg 
        RRA (𝛾) 
 
15.864 13.349 16.088 13.436 15.795 13.414 
S.E. 
 
7.203 3.916 6.975 5.694 5.918 3.334 
Adjusted RRA (𝛾) 7.932 6.674 8.044 6.718 7.898 6.707 
Implied 𝑅𝑓/Quarter 8.051 7.261     
Pricing Error 0.934 0.938 0.941 0.946 1.115 1.121 
P-Value   0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.019 0.019 
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Table 1.4 
Intermediaries’ assets and liabilities and risk aversion  
This table presents relative risk aversion estimates.  The moment conditions are  
E [𝛽 (
Xt+1
Xt
)
−γ
𝑅𝑡+1⨂𝑧𝑡] = 1 
Xs are: Consumption, intermediaries’ Asset and Liability.  RRA (𝛾) is the estimated relative risk aversion 
coefficient. GMM p-values are in the parenthesis.  The first estimate of RRA is from the above moment condition, 
and the adjusted estimate corrects for time aggregation by a factor of ½ following Breeden, Gibbons, and 
Litzenberger (1989).  Implied 𝑅𝑓  is based on the estimated risk aversion. The pricing errors are the root mean 
squared errors.  First three columns present the results with market returns and instruments described in Table 1.2.  
Next three columns present the estimates of RRA with market and risk-free returns and without instruments.  Last 
three columns present the estimates with returns on the 25 Fama-French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios 
(FF25) without instruments.  For Asset and Liability, DF (β) the subjective discount factor is estimated for the first 
two models.  Each subsequent models use the estimated β from liabilities.   
 
Iterated GMM Estimates of RRA (𝛾) and DF (β) 
Test Assets   𝑅  & Instruments 𝑅  & 𝑅𝑓  FF 25  
  
Asset Liability Consumption Asset Liability Consumption Asset Liability Consumption 
    
β = 1.034 
RRA (𝛾) 
 
3.845 3.767 10.037 4.153 4.192 14.193 5.843 5.188 15.617 
S.E. 
 
0.266 0.211 1.019 0.417 0.337 1.637 0.404 0.303 1.346 
DF (β) 
 
1.032 1.034 
       S.E. 
 
0.006 0.004 
       Adjusted RRA (𝛾) 
 
1.922 1.883 5.018 2.077 2.096 7.097 2.921 2.594 7.808 
Implied 𝑅𝑓/Quarter 
 
1.264 1.385 1.263 
   
3.811 3.314 3.111 
Pricing Error 0.056 0.045 0.094 1.519 1.492 1.504 0.078 0.070 0.091 
P-Value 
 
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.004 0.004 0.005 
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Table 1.5 
The estimates of relative risk aversion with conditional consumption  
This table presents relative risk aversion estimates.  The moment conditions are 
E [𝛽 (
Xt+1
Xt
)
−γ
𝑅𝑡+1⨂𝑧𝑡] = 1 
Xs are: consumption and consumption conditioned with the growth of assets (cag) and liabilities (clg) respectively.  
RRA (𝛾) is the estimated relative risk aversion coefficient. GMM p-values are in the parenthesis.  The first estimate 
of RRA is from the above moment condition, and the adjusted estimate corrects for time aggregation by a factor of 
½ following Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989).  Implied 𝑅𝑓  is based on the estimated risk aversion. The 
pricing errors are the root mean squared errors.  First three columns present the results with market returns and 
instruments described in Table 2.  Next three columns present the estimates of RRA with market and risk-free 
returns without instruments.  Last three columns present the estimates with returns on the 25 Fama-French (1993) 
size and book-to-market portfolios (FF25) without instruments.  For cag and clg, the subjective discount factor, DF 
(β), is estimated (first two models).  Each subsequent models use the estimated β from cag.   
 
 
 
Iterated GMM Estimates of RRA (𝛾) and DF (β) 
Test Assets 𝑅  & Instruments 𝑅  & 𝑅𝑓  FF 25 
 
cag clg Consumption cag clg Consumption cag clg Consumption 
   
β = 0.977 
RRA (𝛾) 0.336 0.351 19.416 2.680 2.351 32.243 1.824 1.479 24.981 
S.E. 0.223 0.189 6.713 1.216 1.175 11.617 0.865 0.844 8.279 
DF (β) 0.977 0.976 
       S.E. 0.005 0.005 
       Adjusted RRA (𝛾) 0.168 0.176 9.708 1.340 1.176 16.122 0.912 0.740 12.491 
Implied 𝑅𝑓/Quarter 2.501 2.512 11.740 
   
3.158 2.996 14.415 
Pricing Error 0.054 0.051 0.083 0.734 0.730 0.723 0.073 0.072 0.079 
P-Value 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.045 0.045 0.056 0.004 0.004 0.005 
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Table 1.6 
Intermediaries’ Equity and Leverage 
This table presents relative risk aversion estimates.  The moment conditions are 
E [𝛽 (
Xt+1
Xt
)
−γ
𝑅𝑡+1⨂𝑧𝑡] = 1 
Xs are: Equity = (Asset − Liability) and Leverage = (Asset Equity)⁄ .  RRA (𝛾) is the estimated relative risk 
aversion coefficient. GMM p-values are in the parenthesis.  The first estimate of RRA is from the above moment 
condition, and the adjusted estimate corrects for time aggregation by a factor of ½ following Breeden, Gibbons, and 
Litzenberger (1989).  Implied 𝑅𝑓  is based on the estimated risk aversion. The pricing errors are the root mean 
squared errors.  First two columns present the results with market returns and instruments described in Table 2.  
Next two columns present the estimates of RRA with market and risk-free returns without instruments.  Last two 
columns present the estimates with returns on the 25 Fama-French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios (FF25) 
without instruments.  For Equity and Leverage, the subjective discount factor, DF (β), is estimated for the first two 
models.  Each subsequent models use the respective β estimates.   
 
 
Iterated GMM Estimates of RRA (𝛾) and DF (β) 
Test Assets 𝑅  & Instruments 𝑅  & 𝑅𝑓  FF 25 
  
Equity Leverage Equity Leverage Equity Leverage 
    
β = 0.95 
RRA (𝛾) 
 
-1.857 3.433 -0.560 -104.252 -3.428 1.335 
S.E. 
 
1.128 0.580 0.584 14.878 0.319 0.500 
DF (β) 
 
0.952 0.956 
    
S.E. 
 
0.014 0.005 
    
Adjusted RRA (𝛾) -0.928 1.717 -0.280 -52.126 -1.714 0.502 
Implied 𝑅𝑓/Quarter 3.143 1.912 
  
1.481 3.564 
Pricing Error 0.069 0.051 0.614 1.397 0.094 0.074 
P-Value   0.005 0.004 0.044 0.230 0.005 0.005 
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Table 1.A.1 
Financial Intermediaries and their assets 
This table describes the intermediaries.  Quarterly data is obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds for 
the 1955-2009 sample period.   
 
Financial Intermediaries  
Intermediary Group Members Assets (US$ trillion) by Group 
  
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Insurance Companies Life Insurance 1.64 0.65 1.90 0.08 6.36 
 
Property and Casualty Insurance 
     
       Pension Funds Private Pension Funds 2.59 0.79 3.21 0.02 10.99 
 
Federal Govt. Retirement Funds 
     
 
State Govt. Retirement Funds 
     
       Banks Commercial Banks 3.95 2.34 4.23 0.20 16.86 
 
Credit Unions 
     
 
Savings Institutions 
     
       Shadow-banks Asset Backed Securities 2.42 0.34 3.70 0.01 13.79 
 
Agency/GSE Mortgage Pools 
     
 
Funding Corporations 
     
 
Finance Companies 
     
       Mutual Funds Money Market Funds 1.97 0.15 3.10 0.01 11.18 
 
Mutual Funds 
     
 
Closed End Funds 
     
 
Exchange Traded Funds 
     
       Securities Brokers & Dealers Securities Brokers & Dealers 0.46 0.05 0.77 0.00 3.24 
       Total Assets   16.98 6.65 20.91 0.53 73.66 
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Figure 1.1 
Claim on assets through intermediaries 
This figure shows the intertemporal individuals’ consumption-savings decisions and the role of 
intermediaries in the exchange process.  At date 0, individuals are endowed with 𝑊0 = 𝐶0 +
𝑥𝐶0, where 𝐶0 is consumption and 𝑥𝐶0 is saved through intermediaries.  At date 1, individuals 
consume 𝐶1, which they receive from intermediaries.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 1 Date 0 
Individuals consume 𝑪𝟎 and save 𝒙𝑪𝟎 
Intermediaries’ liabilities 𝒙𝑪𝟎  
Intermediaries invest in risky assets  
Intermediaries keep a portion of profits    
Intermediaries’ liabilities 𝑪𝟏     
Individuals consume 𝑪𝟏     
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Figure 1.2 
The time series of intermediaries’ assets and consumption growth 
This figure shows the time series of quarterly consumption growth and assets growth for six intermediary groups 
(commercial banks, mutual funds, securities brokers and dealers, retirement/pension funds, insurance companies, 
and shadow-banks) over the sample 1955 through 2009.  Gray bands indicate NBER recessions. Both series are 
standardized for ease of comparison.  
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Figure 1.3 
RRA Sensitivities to subjective discount rates 
This figure shows the sensitivity of RRA with the subjective discount rate.  
Figure A compares RRA sensitivity for Asset and Consumption Growth; the left axis is for RRA sensitivities to 
Consumption Growth, the right axis is for RRA sensitivities to Asset Growth.  
Figure B compares RRA sensitivities to Asset and Liabilities Growth. 
 
 
Figure A: Comparison of RRA sensitivity for Asset and Consumption Growth 
 
 
Figure B: Comparison of RRA sensitivity for Asset and Liabilities Growth 
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Figure 1.4 
Intermediaries’ procyclical leverage  
The figure shows the scatter plot of the leverage growth versus the asset growth for six intermediary groups 
(commercial banks, mutual funds, securities brokers and dealers, retirement/pension funds, insurance companies, 
and shadow-banks). The data is from the Federal Flow of Funds for 1955-2009.  The figure also plots the 
regression line.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Intermediary-augmented investment-based asset 
pricing: Theory and Evidence  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Common sense tells us that individuals save through financial intermediaries, such as banks, in 
risky assets, such as stocks.  It is also intuitive that firms borrow from intermediaries rather than 
from individuals because financial intermediaries help reduce asymmetric information between 
borrowers and savers.  However, there are many neoclassical investment- and productivity-
based asset pricing models where firms are assumed to have intermediated external funds at 
some cost, that is, the external funds supply is elastic.  For this strand of the literature, financial 
intermediation is exogenous and firms pay a shadow price for external funds; financially 
constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms pay more for external funds.  The underlying 
assumption is that frictions transferring funds from financial intermediaries to firms are captured 
by the shadow cost of external funds.  We, however, argue that the shadow price of external 
funds is a necessary but not the sufficient condition for acquiring external financing.  The 
48 
 
 
 
rationale is that intermediaries may not be able to provide any funding even though there is a 
price for it.  We show that financial intermediation risk is an important and distinct issue that 
the existing literature does not address.   
Our model builds on the model of Gomes et al. (2006) who examine the asset pricing 
implications of firm financial constraints.  However, we relax their model assumption that firms 
have access to intermediated credits, and allow firm managers to work under the uncertainty of 
external funds that intermediaries provide.  We show that the stochastic discount factor for 
stock returns is affine in intermediary funding shocks.  This is the primary contribution of the 
paper.  
We measure intermediary funding shocks by the growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet 
variables, such as assets.  Next, we conduct stylized empirical tests to ascertain that 
intermediary funding shocks or intermediation factors are important in explaining stock returns.  
Finally, we show that intermediation factors are priced in the cross-section of stock returns. 
Literature (Merton (1971, 1973), among others) suggests that factors driven by economic 
fundamentals must explain why some asset returns are higher than others.  Cochrane (1999) 
further observes that macroeconomic factors are easier to motivate theoretically but none 
explains the value and size premium as well as portfolio-based factors do.  The results in this 
paper show that intermediation factors explain value and size premiums.  To our knowledge, no 
other macro factor can explain value and size premiums as well as intermediation factors do.   
Cochrane (1999) notes that fundamentally determined macro factors may help explain 
why the portfolio-based factors, such as the SMB and HML factors (Fama and French, 1993), 
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explain the cross-section of stock returns so well.  We show that the SMB and HML factors are 
explained by systematic intermediation risk and that the external funds supply for small and 
value relative to large and growth firms are more volatile.  As a consequence, the SMB spread 
expands and the HML spread contracts with the positive intermediation shock.   
While explaining the value and size premium is important, predicting market excess 
returns is another important criterion that an asset pricing factor must fulfill (see Merton (1973), 
Santos and Veronesi (2006), among others).  The reason is that factors cannot possibly both 
explain the cross-section of stock returns and predict stock returns spuriously.  We show that 
intermediation factors predict stock returns. 
A true factor must also explain the cross-section of stock returns, but this should be the 
final asset pricing test.  We show that that intermediations factors outperform investment-based 
(Cochrane, 1996), and productivity-based (Balvers and Huang, 2007) factors in the cross-
sectional tests.   
The implications of our empirical results are two folds.  First, we show that the shadow 
price of external funds may not capture systematic intermediation risk.
11
  Stock portfolios 
formed on firm size are known to capture the level of firm financial constraints, and hence size-
based stock portfolios indirectly capture the shadow price of external funds (see Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), Campello and Chen (2010), among 
others).  Our empirical results show that intermediation factors explain size-based stock 
portfolio returns, and that intermediation factor loadings for small stock returns are larger than 
                                                 
11
 We thank an anonymous seminar participant at Universitat Pompeu Fabra to point out the issue that the shadow 
price of external funds may capture the intermediation risk. 
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that of large stock returns.   Hence, we argue that if intermediation risk were entirely captured in 
the shadow price of external funds, then intermediation factors would not have any explanatory 
power for size-based stock portfolio returns.  We further argue that in a bad state of the world, 
outrageous shadow prices of external funds would exclude firms from receiving any financing.
12
  
Hence, intermediation risk and the shadow price of external funds are related but distinct issues.      
Second, the results in this paper pose considerable challenges to the notion that financial 
frictions can be captured by the default premium, defined as the yield spread between Aaa and 
Baa rated corporate bonds.  Bernanke (1989), and Stock and Watson (1989, 1999) show that the 
default premium is one of the most powerful predictors for economic activities.  Gomes et al. 
(2006) further argue that the default premium captures aggregate financial frictions and that the 
shadow price of external funds is a linear function of the default premium.  We show that 
intermediation risk is more important than the default premium in predicting stock returns and in 
explaining value and size premiums.  Thus, the results suggest intermediation risk is another 
source of risk that may not be captured by the default premium.       
This paper is related to studies that investigate frictions in supplying credits.  On the 
microeconomic front, Q-theory based investments research has a long tradition in investigating 
the shadow price of external funds.
13
  On the macroeconomic front, there exists an extensive 
body of work that investigates financial frictions in supplying credit.  The existing literature 
(e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) study the effect of macroeconomic shocks and business cycles 
                                                 
12
 We thank Pete Kyle for pointing it out.  For example, a highly constrained firm that is willing to pay 100% 
interests on borrowings will be immediately cutoff from external funding.  The reason is that it raises questions 
about the credibility of the firm.  
13
 A partial list includes Hennessy and Whited (2006) and Hennessy (2004).   
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on firms’ demand for funding, and on firms’ ability to secure external financing.  The central 
thread that connects both the macroeconomic and microeconomic research is that financial 
imperfections lead firms to react heterogeneously, and that frictions such as asymmetric 
information often play a significant role in determining the supply of credits.   
 Intriguingly, investigating the role of financial intermediaries in supplying credits in a 
financially imperfect world is relatively rare.  Within microeconomic research, intermediaries’ 
funding is exogenous and firms’ financial constraints are evaluated by considering firm-level 
financial variables.  However, irrespective of whether firms are financially constrained or not, 
firms rely on intermediaries for external funds.  Given a set of investment opportunities, a value 
maximizing manager would optimally choose internal and external funds.  However, the 
existing investment-based asset pricing literature does not answer two important questions.  Are 
optimally chosen external funds available at any given instant?  How do fluctuations in external 
financing affect firm investments decisions, and hence affect investment returns?  We answer 
these questions by incorporating intermediaries’ funding constraints into the firm value 
optimization problem.   
The paper is related to the literature (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), among others) 
that investigate the effect of capital constraints of firms and intermediaries on investments.  The 
paper is also related to recent studies that derive asset prices in the presence of intermediaries, 
such as the models of He and Krishnamurthy (2011 and 2012) and Brunnermeir and Sannikov 
(2011).  However, these studies do not investigate whether fluctuations of intermediaries’ 
wealth can explain stock returns.   
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Guided by the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model, Adrian et al. (2012) consider a 
stochastic discount factor for excess returns that is affine in brokers and dealers’ leverage shocks 
and show that brokers and dealers’ leverage is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.  
However, Johnson (2008) argues that controlling for the aggregate financial position of the 
economy, there should not be any role for the financial position of securities dealers and 
brokerage firms in explaining aggregate fluctuations of overall market liquidity.  Hence, we 
argue and show that the stochastic discount factor for asset returns must be derived from the 
aggregate financial position of intermediaries rather than from the funding liquidity of brokers 
and dealers.  The empirical results show that brokers and dealers’ leverage shocks as an asset 
pricing factor fails to conform to stylized asset pricing tests we conduct.   
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model that derives the 
intermediary-augmented investment-based asset pricing kernel.  Section 2.3 describes data.  
Section 2.4 presents the empirical results.  Section 2.5 concludes.  
 
2.2 The model 
The model builds upon the existing literature on neoclassical investment-based asset pricing 
models.
14
  In contrast to the existing literature, however, we do not assume that firm mangers 
have access to intermediated credits; that is, we do not assume that the external funds supply is 
elastic.  Instead, we argue that firms are able to raise only a portion of the demanded external 
funds at any given instant.  The reason is that when intermediaries are themselves financially 
                                                 
14
 An incomplete list includes Cochrane (1991, 1996); Livdan et al. (2009); Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009); and 
Gomes et al. (2006). 
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constrained, they do not provide funding to all firms in the economy.
15
  We illustrate the issue at 
hand with a simple example.   
Suppose firms demand x dollars.  As per the existing literature, each firm can raise x 
dollars but firms pay varying external financing costs depending on the level of firm financial 
constraints; financially constrained firms relative to financially unconstrained firms pay more for 
external funds.  However, we argue that intermediaries provide a Ω fraction of the demanded 
funds.  That is, firms are able to raise 𝛺 ∗ 𝑥 dollars externally.  Irrespective of the level of firm 
financial constraints and the shadow price of external funds, the same firm can have Ω that 
varies from 0 to 1.  Alternatively, depending on intermediaries’ financial constraints, firms are 
able to raise zero to x dollars.  Specifically, we argue that while the shadow price of external 
funds are important, intermediation risk is a distinct issue: the shadow price of external funds 
sets the financing term, but it does not guarantee that firms are able to raise external funds.       
To address the discussed issue, we define the fund allocation function  Ω(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡) ∈
[0 1] that captures the funds supply elasticity.  Since firm-size has long been used as a proxy for 
firm financial constraints in the literature (see Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Perez-Quiros and 
Timmermann (2000), Campello and Chen (2010), among others), we believe firm size is one of 
the determinants for intermediaries’ funding decisions.  Firm size is also known to affect firm 
external financing (see Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), among others).  Hence, 𝐾𝑡, the firm 
capital stock, is one of the arguments of Ω(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡).  The variable 𝜁𝑡  is exogenous, and it captures 
firms’ production innovations such as input costs, output prices, and productivity that affect the 
                                                 
15
 The issue is quite evident from the ongoing intermediary triggered financial crisis in the U.S and Europe. 
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firm capital accumulation.  Alternatively, 𝜁𝑡  summarizes all forms of uncertainty.  While the 
nature of the evolution of Ω with the business cycle is investigated in sub-section 4.3, we do not 
specifically model Ω because the exact mathematical form of Ω has no bindings on what 
follows.  Instead, we investigate how firms respond to the innovation in Ω in an investment-
based asset pricing framework.   
 
2.2.1 The derivation of investment returns  
This section derives firm investment returns.  The derivation follows the existing literature (e.g., 
Cochrane 1991 and 1996, and Gomes et al., 2006), but the condition that the external funds 
supply is elastic is relaxed.     
Model assumptions and setup:  
1) A value maximizing manager optimizes firm value V(. ), and she needs external 
financing.  The manager has complete access to financial markets.     
2) Firms investment, 𝐼𝑡, and investment decisions are made by choosing the optimal 
amount of capital at the beginning of the next period, 𝐾𝑡+1.  Investment spending and 
dividends are financed by internal cash flows from gross profit and external funds that 
intermediaries provide.   
3) The external funds demand is new equity, 𝑋𝑡, and new one-period debt, 𝐵𝑡+1.  One-
period debt simplifies the notations without changing the asset pricing implications 
(see Gomes et al., 2006).  Since intermediaries provide a Ω fraction of the demanded 
external funds, the new external funds supply is Ω𝑡(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡)(𝑋𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1).     
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4) The gross profit function Π(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡) is linear in capital, and   𝐾𝑡, the capital stock, 
depreciates at the rate of δ.  The exact mathematical form of Π is not important in the 
current context.     
5) The adjustment costs per unit of capital  Ψ(𝐾𝑡, 𝐼𝑡) are convex with  α > 0 as the 
curvature.  
Under the above assumptions, the firm value maximization problem can be written as 
V(𝐾𝑡, Ω𝑡, 𝐵𝑡, 𝜁𝑡) ≡ max{𝐾𝑡+1}{𝐷𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡Ω(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡) +𝐸𝑡[M𝑡+1V(𝐾𝑡+1, Ω𝑡+1, 𝐵𝑡+1, 𝜁𝑡+1)]}   (1)  
where 𝐷𝑡  is the dividend and M𝑡+1 is the stochastic discount factor for firm owners between time 
t to t+1.  𝑋𝑡Ω(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡) captures the firm value dilution effect following the new equity issuance 
𝑋𝑡, where for simplicity we have assumed that there is one to one correspondence between the 
value dilution and new equity issuance, and this assumption has no bindings on the model (see 
Gomes et al., 2006).   
Dividends are net of gross profits, new external funds, investments, debt repayments, and 
the adjustment cost to capital.   
𝐷𝑡 = Π(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡) + Ω(𝐾𝑡, 𝜁𝑡)(𝑋𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1) − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡Ω(𝐾𝑡−1, 𝜁𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡 −Ψ(𝐾𝑡, 𝐼𝑡)𝐾𝑡  (2) 
Where adjustment costs to capital is Ψ(𝐾𝑡, 𝐼𝑡)𝐾𝑡 =
𝛼
2
[
𝐼𝑡
𝐾𝑡
]2𝐾𝑡     (3) 
the capital accumulation follows K𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡     (4) 
and the dividend constraint is  𝐷𝑡 ≥ ?̅?      (5) 
where ?̅? is the dividend bound based on firms’ dividend policies, and 𝑅𝑡  is the gross (interest 
plus principle) repayment per dollar of debt raised. 
 Let 𝜆𝑡 be the Lagrange multiplier, the shadow cost of external funding, associated with 
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the constraint (5).  If  Mt+1 follows  E[Mt+1Rt+1
I ] = 1 then investment returns are given by 
(derived in the appendix A) 
Rt+1
I =
1+𝜆𝑡+1
1+𝜆𝑡
{Π𝑘+1+Ω𝑘+1(𝐵𝑡+2)+
𝛼
2
𝑖𝑡+1
2 +(1−𝛿)(1+𝛼𝑖𝑡+1)}
(1+𝛼𝑖𝑡)
     (6)  
where,  𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡⁄ ,  Π𝑘+1 = δΠ(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝜁𝑡+1) 𝛿𝐾𝑡+1⁄ , and  Ω𝑘+1 = δΩ(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝜁𝑡+1) 𝛿𝐾𝑡+1⁄ . 
To gain a better understanding of the role of financial intermediation equation (6) could 
be decomposed into firm specific and financial intermediary specific components as:   
Rt+1
I = R𝑡+1
𝑎 |FirmSpecific + R𝑡+1
𝑏 |IntermediaryFundingSpecific       (7)  
where,
 
R𝑡+1
𝑎 |FirmSpecific =
1+𝜆𝑡+1
1+𝜆𝑡
{Π𝑘+1 +
𝛼
2
𝑖𝑡+1
2 + (1 − 𝛿)(1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡+1)} (1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡)⁄  (8)  
R𝑡+1
𝑏 |IntermediaryFundingSpecific =
1+𝜆𝑡+1
1+𝜆𝑡
{Ω𝑘+1(𝐵𝑡+2)} (1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡)⁄    (9)  
Equation (6) shows that investment returns, in addition to firm specific characteristics, 
depend on intermediaries’ funding shocks captured by Ω𝑘+1.  Equation (6) further shows that a) 
if 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 then financial constraints have fixed effect on firm investment returns and b) 
if 𝜆𝑡 ≠ 𝜆𝑡+1 then financial constraints have variable effects on firm investment returns.  
Gomes et al. (2006) argue that if 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 = 0 then investment returns are driven by 
firm fundamentals, such as  𝑖𝑡 and  Π𝑘+1.  However, we show that even if 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 =
0, investment returns depend on external funding risk.  Alternatively, even if financial markets 
are perfect, firms face the uncertainty of securing external funds.   
Equation (9) is the essence of our model.  It shows that Ω𝑘+1, the marginal funding that 
intermediaries provide relative to firm capital is one of the determinants of investment returns.  
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If intermediaries’ funds supply relative to firm capital remains unchanged,   Ω𝑘+1 = 0, then 
financial intermediation has no effect on investment returns and equation (6) transforms to 
equation (8), which is the expression Gomes et al. (2006) derive.  Generally, intermediaries’ 
funds supply relative to firm capital fluctuates, that is, Ω𝑘+1 ≠ 0, and hence innovations in 
external funds produce time series variations in investment returns.  The economic 
interpretation of equation (9) is that it captures the cyclical component of leverage in investment 
returns.  The relationship further shows that the shadow price for external funds is a necessary 
but not the sufficient condition for external funds.  That is, we show that the shadow price and 
the risk of securing external funds coexist.   
 
2.2.2 Testable implications 
We want to empirically investigate whether the intermediary specific component given by 
equation (9) has asset pricing implications.  In particular, we test  
𝐸𝑡[M𝑡+1R𝑡+1] = 1         (10) 
where  M𝑡+1 is the stochastic discount factor and R𝑡+1 is a vector of asset returns 
including stocks, bonds, and 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐼  from equation (6).  Following the investment-based asset 
pricing literature (Cochrane (1996), Gomes et al. (2006), among others), we parameterize the 
stochastic discount factor as a linear function of investment returns.
16
 
M𝑡+1 = 𝑙0 + 𝑙1𝑅𝑡+1
𝐼          (11)  
                                                 
16
 Equation (11) provides a reasonable approximation.  However, in complete general equilibrium setup one can 
derive the stochastic discount factor in terms of investment returns from economic theories.  In Appendix C, we 
provide one such model where it is shown that the stochastic discount factor is inversely related to investment 
returns. 
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Equation (11) thus shows that the stochastic discount factor for asset returns is affine not 
only in productivity shocks 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎  but also in intermediation shocks 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑏 .  Note that the existing 
investment-based models have  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 .  We argue that  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑏 is more important and may 
encompass 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎  in explaining the stock returns dynamics. 
One important implication of equation (11) is as follows.  Brunnermeir and Pedersen 
(2009) argue that the funding liquidity of traders determines the pricing kernel for the cross-
section of securities.  Based on the Brunnermeir and Pedersen (2009) model, Adrian et al. 
(2012) show that securities brokers and dealers’ leverage is priced in the cross-section of stock 
returns. However, the Johnson (2008) model suggests that controlling for the aggregate financial 
position of the economy, there should not be any role for the financial position of securities 
dealers and brokerage firms (i.e., traders) in explaining aggregate fluctuations of overall market 
liquidity.  While investigating traders’ liquidity is important in the crisis management, studying 
the liquidity dynamics with a larger set of intermediaries has far more economic ramifications.  
Since traders are involved dealing with marketable securities, their reach for assets in the 
economy is limited.  By contrast, intermediaries in aggregate enter into transactions that 
involve every conceivable asset in the economy.  The model presented here shows that any 
intermediary, including traders, or intermediaries in aggregate, determines the pricing kernel.  
In the empirical section of the paper, we show securities brokers and dealers’ leverage fails 
important asset pricing tests that we discuss next. 
Asset pricing theories at least since Merton (1971, 1973) recognized that factors driven 
by economic fundamentals must explain asset returns anomalies.  In this paper, we conduct 
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stylized asset pricing tests to show that intermediation factors derived from the intermediaries’ 
balance sheet growth directly addresses the issue.  While the existing factors motivated by 
economic fundamentals may be sound from a theoretical perspective, we show that these factors 
fail to conform to stylized asset pricing tests.  One of the plausible reasons for failures for such 
factors is perhaps driven by measurement errors.  We show that factors driven by economic 
fundamentals and measured from a readily available intermediation dataset with minimal data 
transformations can explain such stylized facts such as the value and size premium.  This is the 
essence of our empirical tests.   
The primary testable implication is to investigate whether  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑏  is an economically 
important factor for stock returns.  Since we want to investigate the systematic effect of 
intermediation shocks on stock returns, we use the growth of assets of a large number of the U.S. 
intermediaries to proxy for  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑏 , and this is the primary intermediation factor.  Since 
intermediaries’ assets evolve endogenously with other balance sheet variables, we also consider 
the growth of other balance sheet variables, such as leverage, to proxy for intermediation shocks.  
The usage of the growth of balance sheet variables to proxy for intermediary funding shocks is 
common in the literature (e.g., Adrian and Shin (2009), Adrian et al. (2012), among others).     
Though simplistic, the argument that the balance sheet growth proxy for 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑏  parallels 
that of Cochrane’s (1991) in three ways.  First, since aggregated capital does not change 
considerably within a short time interval, the intermediary funding specific investment returns 
component (see equation 9) is proportional to the innovations in intermediaries’ balance sheet 
variables.  Second, the term (1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡) is fairly steady in aggregate; Cochrane (1991) estimates 
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that 𝑖𝑡 has a mean of 0.137 and 𝛼 is about 13.04.  Third, we presume that in the first difference 
all noises are eliminated.  We have also assumed that 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1, that is, the shadow price for 
external funds is constant over a short time interval.  This allows for focusing on the role of 
intermediary funding shocks on stock returns.  We, however, control for firm financial 
constraints to account for the shadow price for external funds in the empirical tests.  
Cochrane (1996) observes that for the lack of explicit productivity shocks data, 
investment returns proxy for 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 .  While Cochrane (1996) uses residential- and non-residential 
investment returns as factors for asset returns, we use aggregated private-investments returns as 
the investment factor.  The specification we adopted is also consistent with the literature 
(Balvers and Huang, 2007).   
Balvers and Huang (2007) (BH hereafter) show that without adjustment costs to 
capital 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎  is same as 𝐹𝑘(𝜃𝑡+1, 𝑛𝑡+1, 𝑘𝑡+1), where 𝐹𝐾 is the partial derivative of the production 
function with respect to capital 𝑘𝑡+1, 𝜃𝑡+1 is the productivity, and per-capita inputs into the 
production process are labor  𝑛𝑡+1 and capital  𝑘𝑡+1 .
17
  The productivity level follows the 
Markov process  𝜃𝑡+1 = 𝐻(𝜃𝑡 , 𝜖𝑡), where  𝜖𝑡 are productivity shocks.  They argue that asset 
returns in the cross-section can be explained by the innovations in  𝜖𝑡, and that 
conditioning 𝜖𝑡 with  𝜃𝑡  and 𝑘𝑡  is important since productivity and capital are time-varying.   
Their unconditional and conditional productivity-shocks-based factors perform well relative to 
investment returns (and other alternative factors) in explaining the cross-section of stock returns.  
As a result, we employ BH productivity factors to proxy for 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 .  We denote productivity 
                                                 
17
 BH further show that investment growth and productivity shocks are positively related with unit elasticity.  
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factors as PF1 and PF2, where the first factor is unconditional productivity shocks and the latter 
is productivity shocks conditioned with the productivity state, which is derived from the 
cointergrating residuals of 𝜃𝑡  and 𝑘𝑡.  The construction of the productivity factors is described 
in the Appendix B.  We use productivity factors of BH throughout the paper for robustness 
checks. 
Given the discussions above, the testable factor analogues of equation (11) are written as 
follows.  The investment-based stochastic discount factor is   
 M𝑡+1 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑡+1
1         (12)  
where  𝑓𝑡+1
1  is measured either by investment returns following Cochrane (1996) or by the 
productivity factors of BH.  
The intermediation-augmented investment-based stochastic discount factor is written as  
M𝑡+1 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑡+1
1 ++𝛽2𝑓𝑡+1
2        (13)  
where 𝑓𝑡+1
2  is measured by the growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet variables.  
 
2.3 Data 
The quarterly-sample under investigation dates from the first quarter of 1955 to the fourth 
quarter of 2009.  Unless noted otherwise, all data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.  Intermediaries’ balance sheet data is obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds.  
The balance sheet data at the Federal Flow of Funds are reported at the subsidiary level, and 
hence any possibility of double counting is eliminated.  Following Adrian and Shin (2009), we 
include 17 intermediaries to proxy for the U.S. financial intermediation, and these intermediaries 
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are grouped into six categories: banks, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
securities brokers & dealers, and shadow-banks.
18
  Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics 
for these intermediaries.  For the subsequent analysis, we aggregate intermediaries’ balance 
sheet data, and following balance sheet variables are used: assets, liabilities,  equity =
(assets − liabilities),and leverage, where leverage is defined as leverage = (assets equity).⁄   
Intermediation factors are the growth of the above four variables. 
We obtain Fama-French factors, size and book-to-market portfolios, and risk free (T-bills) 
rates from Ken French’s website. Investments data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  cay, the consumption to wealth ratio of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) is obtained 
from Martin Lettau’s website.  Productivity shocks data is obtained from Ronald Balvers’s 
website.  Adrian et al. (2012) show that securities brokers and dealers’ leverage is priced in the 
cross-section of stock returns; hence, we obtain ‘the leverage factor’ from Tyler Muir’s website.   
We get consistent intermediation data from the first quarter of 1951.  However, to 
account for the initial data reporting errors we discard data from 1951 to 1954.  As a result, the 
final sample is from 1955 through 2009.  Since we have access to productivity shocks data from 
1964 through 2004, whenever productivity shocks data are used for the analysis, we use the 
above sub-sample.  The sub-sample analysis allows for additional robustness checks.     
 
2.4 Main empirical results 
The empirical results show that intermediation factors are significantly correlated with excess 
                                                 
18 See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010) for more details about shadow banking. 
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market returns.  These factors explain not only the return variations of small and value stocks 
but also the Fama-French SMB and HMB factors.  When intermediation factors are paired with 
investment returns or BH productivity factors, intermediation factors maintain their explanatory 
powers for stock returns.  Importantly, none of the competing factors can explain value and size 
premiums by themselves or in the presence of intermediation factors.  Intermediation factors 
further predict excess market returns, and hence behave as state variables.  By contrast, 
investment returns and BH productivity factors have limited predictive poser for excess market 
returns.   
 
2.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.2 Panel A compares the distribution of the intermediation and competing factors.  The 
factors are: the growth of intermediaries’ financial assets (ASSET), liabilities (LIAB), equity 
(EQUITY), leverage (LEV), returns on investments (INV) in excess of T-bill returns, and BH 
productivity factors: PF1 and PF2. 
Except for EQUITY, Table 2 Panel A shows that the correlation between all balance sheet 
variables and excess returns on value-weighted NYSE stocks (MKT) is above 60%.  INV is 
inversely correlated to MKT and the inverse relationship is well established in the literature (see 
the Appendix C for the formal derivation), and productivity factors are positively correlated to 
MKT.   
Table 2.2 Panel B reports the auto-correlation structure of intermediation factors.  While 
EQUITY and LEV shows some level of persistence, ASSET and LIAB are neither persistent nor 
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random; ASSET and LIAB follow a pulsating wave pattern where positive pulses come in every 
second and fourth quarter.   
Figure 2.1 provides a graphical comparison of ASSET and INV in the first plot.  The 
second plot in figure 1 compares ASSET and PF1.   
The first plot shows that intermediaries’ asset growth is far more volatile than 
investments returns and the pattern is consistent throughout the whole sample.  The plot also 
suggests that INV lags behind ASSET, and the lag is more pronounced during recessions.   
The lower volatility of INV relative to ASSET is interpreted as follows.  Production 
processes require investments, which is sourced internally from firm profits, and externally by 
borrowings from intermediaries.  Since intermediaries have the ability to monitor firm 
productivity, they are more likely to allocate their lending efficiently.  In a bad state of the 
world, lower firm productivity leads to lower funding and vice versa.   Alternatively, 
intermediation shocks are more volatile.  On the contrary, aggregated investments are 
persistent.  The reason for which is that the resource allocation from unproductive to productive 
assets at the firm level requires time.  Among other reasons, adjustment costs to capital reduce 
firms’ ability to mobilize their resources proactively.  Hence, investments are far less volatile 
than asset growths, that is, aggregated investments are less volatile than intermediation shocks.   
We interpret the investments lag, specifically during recessions, as follows.  During 
recessions not only firm profitability falls but also external financing becomes difficult.  Hence, 
investments suffer from two fronts.  The plot seems to capture the effect by the sharp decline in 
investments towards the end of recessions.  Unreported Granger Causality tests show that 
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intermediaries’ asset growth indeed predicts investments but the reverse is not true. 
Looking at the second plot, we observe that ASSET is more volatile than PF1.  While 
the volatility of productivity shocks is more prominent before the 1980s, the volatility of asset 
growth is dominant in the rest of the sample.  We do not observe any discernible lead-lag 
pattern between those two factors.  Unreported Granger Causality tests confirm the absence of 
any relationship between the two.  To save space, we do not plot PF2 or the productivity state 
since the relationship is similar to that for PF1.    
 
2.4.2 Explaining value & size premiums 
Cochrane (1999) notes that macroeconomic factors are easier to motivate theoretically but none 
explains the value and size portfolios as well as Fama-French factors do.  Cochrane (1999) 
further observes, “….the next step is to link these more fundamentally determined factors with 
the empirically more successful value and small-firm factor portfolios.  Because of 
measurement difficulties and selection biases, fundamentally determined macroeconomic factors 
will never approach the empirical performance of portfolio-based factors.  However, they may 
help to explain which portfolio-based factors really work and why.” 
In retrospect, we examine the statistical and economic significance of intermediation 
factors vis-à-vis the value and size premium.  We follow the Fama and French (1993) procedure 
where size and book-to-market portfolios are used to evaluate the factor performance.  We 
estimate factor loadings from the following regression following Fama and French (1993). 
R𝑖,𝑗
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑗𝑅𝑋 + 𝜀       (14) 
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where R𝑖,𝑗
  represents excess returns on 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios, and 
𝑅𝑋  is a factor.  If factors are portfolio returns then excess returns are used to evaluate the 
loadings.  If factors are not returns, then the factor growth is used to estimate the loadings.  In 
addition to the factors described earlier, we have included the CAPM (MKT) as an additional 
factor to compare the results with that of Fama and French (1993). 
Table 2.3 Panel A replicates Table 4 of the Fama and French (1993) paper, where the 
explanatory variable is MKT.  Table 3 Panel A also reports the loadings of ASSET for the ease 
of comparison.  The loadings of MKT on the size and book-to-market portfolios are similar to 
the Fama and French’s (1993) results.  Looking at the results for RFOA, it loads more on the 
value and small stocks than the high book-to-market and large stocks, and hence explains value 
and size premiums.  In terms of the factor loading pattern, ASSET loads size and book-to-
market portfolios as well as MKT does.  In terms of the loading sensitivity, however, stocks are 
more sensitive to ASSET than MKT.  Alternatively, stocks are more sensitive to systematic 
intermediation risk than systematic stock market risk.   
Table 2.3 Panel B presents the loadings of INV, and it shows that the loadings are erratic 
and often statistically insignificant.  Hence, INV cannot explain value and size premiums.   
For parsimony, we do not report the factor loadings of PF1 and PF2.  While the 
statistical significance is below 10% for big and high book-to-market stock portfolios, factor 
loadings are reasonably good.  Since the loadings for big and high book-to-market stocks are 
not as robust, we investigate whether PF1 and PF2 can explain the Fama-French SMB and HML 
factors in the next sub-section.     
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Looking at the loadings of LIAB and LEV on size and book-to-market portfolios reported 
in Table 2.3 Panel C, we observe that LIAB and LEV loads the portfolios as well as ASSET 
does.  Since balance sheet variables commove, the loadings of the growth of liabilities and 
leverage are similar to that of assets.  Since EQUITY loads size and book-to-market portfolios 
like other intermediation factors the results are not reported.  We also omit ROL, the growth of 
liabilities, from subsequent analyses because liabilities and assets are highly correlated, and 
hence all tests including the loadings on size and book-to-market portfolios for LIAB and 
ASSET are similar. 
The results above show, even if we control for firm financial constraints by firm size, and 
hence shadow costs of external funds, intermediation risk remains a robust and dominant factor 
to explain stock returns.  That is, the results imply that intermediation risk and firm financial 
constraints may coexist.  
To check the robustness of the results, we control for financial frictions.  Following 
Gomes et al. (2006), we use the default premium (CREDIT), defined as the yield spread between 
Moody’s Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds, as a measure of aggregate financial frictions.  The 
default premium is one of the most powerful predictors of aggregate economic conditions (see 
Bernanke, 1989).  The default premium is also used as the premium of external funds (see 
Kashyap et al. (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Bernanke et al. (1996, 1999), among 
others).  In addition, we further control for the term-spread (TERM), the difference between the 
yields on 10-year Treasuries and 3-month T-bills.  Unreported results show that controlling for 
CREDIT and TERM does not change the results qualitatively.   
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Table 2.3 Panel D presents zero-cost hedge portfolio returns or factor loading differentials 
for intermediation factors.  Not to create confusion with the Fama-French SMB and HML, 
which are also zero-cost hedge portfolio returns, we represent the corresponding factor loading 
differentials as S-B and H-L.  For brevity, we present the results for extreme portfolios, that is, 
we consider portfolios 1, 5, 20, and 25.   
Looking first at the H-L spread, ASSET has the best performance.  Looking at the S-B 
spread, EQUITY has the best performance.  ASSET performs the best when we consider both 
the H-L and S-B spreads.   
Importantly, in terms of factor loading differentials, intermediation factors are far better 
than MKT.  For example, by buying portfolio 5 and selling portfolio 1 the H-L spread is 1.93% 
per quarter for ASSET (reported in Table 2.3 Panel D) and the corresponding spread is 0.35% per 
quarter for MKT (not reported but evident from Table 2.3 Panel A).  The results thus suggests if 
one were to hedge against systematic intermediation risk rather than hedge against systematic 
stock market risk, the hedge portfolio based on systematic risk would be more profitable.  Since 
there are limits to arbitrage, the long-short portfolio construction, as describes, may not be 
possible in reality.  However, the analysis shows the importance of systematic intermediation 
risk.    
Backed by the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) theory, Adrian et al. (2012) consider a 
stochastic discount factor for excess returns that is affine in brokers and dealers’ leverage shocks 
and show that brokers and dealers’ leverage is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.  We 
next test whether securities brokers and dealers’ leverage shocks can explain why some stock 
69 
 
 
 
returns are higher than others.  Table 2.3 Panel E shows that securities brokers and dealers’ 
leverage (BDLEV) cannot explain 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios. 
 Having observed that intermediaries’ balance-sheet growth as factors can explain the 
value and size premium, we now explore whether these factors can explain the Fama-French 
SMB and HML factors.   
 
2.4.3 Explaining SMB and HML factors 
In this section, we explain the SMB and HML factors by intermediation factors.  The 
investigation addresses Cochrane’s (1999) observation that fundamentally determined macro 
factors may explain why portfolio-based factors perform well.   
We run regressions with either the SMB or the HML factor as the dependent variable and 
one of the intermediation factors as the explanatory variable.  We further augment 
intermediation factors with investment- and production-based factors to investigate the 
importance of intermediations factors over other factors.  Table 2.4 Panel A and Table 2.4 Panel 
B present the regression results for the SMB and HML factors respectively.   
Looking at Table 2.4 Panel A from the left, models 1 through 3 show that intermediation 
factors ASSET, LEV, and EQUITY explain SMB with robust coefficients.  The results suggest 
that a positive intermediation shock expands the SMB spread.  As for the competing factors 
only PF1 (model 5) explain the SMB spread.  The intermediation-augmented productivity-
based or investment-based models (models 6 through 11) show that intermediation factors 
maintain their explanatory power.   
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Looking at Table 2.4 Panel B, intermediation factors (models 1 through 3) explain the 
HML spread with the correct sign of the coefficients: a positive intermediation shock contracts 
the HML spread.  As for the competing factors, INV (model 4) is the only factor that explains 
the HML spread.  Taken all factors together (models 6 through 11), none except intermediation 
factors can explain the HML spread.
19
   
Looking at the adjusted R-squares, we observe that augmenting intermediation factors 
with investment or productivity factors do not enhance the explanatory power for the SMB and 
HML factors considerably.  Importantly, all intermediation factors by themselves have far better 
explanatory power than pure-play investment and productivity factors for the SMB and HML 
factors.        
The results thus suggest that while intermediation factors can explain both the SMB and 
HML factors, the competing investment- or productivity-based factors cannot explain both the 
SMB and HML factors.   
Why do intermediation factors explain the SMB and HML factors so well?  The answer 
to the question rests both on the relationship among intermediaries’ balance sheet variables and 
on the relationship between intermediaries and firms.  We first investigate how intermediaries’ 
balance sheet variables interact with each other with the business cycle.  Next, we relate the 
evolution of intermediaries’ balance sheets to firm characteristics.  
Adrian and Shin (2010) discuss the relationship between intermediaries’ equity and 
leverage and its implication on intermediaries’ balance sheets.   They show commercial banks 
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 However, BH show that ‘productivity state’ predicts the HML spread at longer time horizons (12- and 16-
quarters-ahead-forecasts).   
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target a preset leverage and investment banks’ leverage is procyclical.   As asset prices rise, 
intermediaries’ equity rises, thereby lowering the leverage.  Commercial banks respond to the 
falling leverage by expanding the balance sheet by borrowing and lending more to revert back to 
the desired leverage.  The effect of asset prices on investment banks’ balance sheets is more 
pronounced since their leverage is procyclical.  Investment banks borrow and lend more than 
commercial banks and their leverage keep rising with the rising asset prices until an asset price 
bubble sets in.       
By contrast, we show intermediaries’ leverage in aggregate is procyclical.  In Figure 
2.2, we show the relationship between intermediaries’ asset and leverage growths.  The positive 
slope of the regression line implies that intermediaries’ leverage is procyclical.   
As a direct consequence, in economic expansions when asset prices are high 
intermediaries expand the balance sheet.  In the process, intermediaries have no choice but to 
provide liquidity to every financially eligible firm in the economy.  In recessions, however, 
intermediaries contract the balance sheet by borrowing and lending less.  It is the smaller firms 
that are more affected in recessions since their liquidation value, which is what intermediaries 
care for, is smaller.  Since the liquidation value is smaller and the default probability is higher 
for smaller firms, intermediaries shun these firms in recessions.  That is, funding from 
intermediaries to smaller firms is more volatile with the business cycle.  On the other hand, 
large firms’ external funding is less volatile.  Hence, the size premium arises from systematic 
intermediation risk.          
Value firms are typically established firms that ran out of steam.  These firms receive 
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funding from intermediaries in economic expansions because intermediaries have no choice, and 
because the borrowing cost is possibly lower than the return on investment for these firms.  
However, in recessions, when borrowing costs are higher, intermediaries have no monetary 
incentive to provide funding to value firms since the return on investment for value firms is 
lower than the borrowing cost.  That is, external funding for value firms is more volatile.  
Hence, the value premium arises from systematic intermediation risk.   
While firms’ distress may be an explanation for the SMB and HML factors (see Fama and 
French, 1993), none of our explanations require firms be distressed; the SMB and HML factors 
simply capture systematic intermediation risk.   
Literature (Gomes et al., 2006) investigates the procyclical nature of the shadow price of 
external funds.  We show that intermediaries’ funding exhibits procyclical variations.  That is, 
the results show that firms are exposed not only to varying shadow prices for external funds but 
also to varying availability of external funds.  In a bad state of the world, when firms are more 
likely to be financially constrained they also are less likely to receive external funds since 
intermediaries’ contract the balance sheet by lending less in such a state.   
In summary, intermediation factors conforms to what Merton’s (1971, 1973) theory 
implies: factors must explain why average returns of some assets are higher than that of others.  
The results further suggest that intermediation factors dominate investment and productivity 
factors in explaining stock returns.   
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2.4.4 Predicting market excess returns 
Literature (Merton (1973), Campbell (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a), and Santos and 
Veronesi (2006), among others) suggests that a state variable must forecast excess market 
returns.  As a result, we investigate whether intermediation factors can predict excess market 
returns to ascertain that these factors are indeed state variables.   
Fama and French (1988), among others, argue that the forecast for a moving sum of the 
market return is better than forecasting a single market return realization since forecasting for a 
moving sum improves the signal-to-noise ratio.  Following Balvers and Huang (2007), we 
forecast the moving average rather than the moving sum of excess market returns by 
intermediation factors, and we run the following regression: 
MVA𝑡, 𝐾𝑇
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀       (15) 
where MVA𝑡, 𝐾𝑇
  is the moving average of excess market returns over four quarters t 
through t-3, an intermediation factor is f , and j varies from one to five for one- through five-
quarter-ahead forecasts.  The estimated β are reported in Table 2.5.   
Looking at Table 2.5 Panel A, the results show that both ASSET and LEV produce robust 
results in predicting excess market returns, and thus show that these two factors are indeed state 
variables.  However, EQUITY has no predictive power for excess market returns.  The result 
is consistent with intermediaries’ procyclical leverage.  Among the three factors, LEV and 
ASSET fluctuate more than EQUITY with the business cycle, and hence the growth of leverage 
and assets better predicts excess market returns.   
To check the robustness of the results, we control for variables that are known to have 
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strong predictive power for market returns.  In addition to TERM and CREDIT, we use cay, the 
consumption to wealth ratio of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) as additional controls.  The 
robustness results with additional controls are not presented to save space.  The unreported 
results show that after including additional controls, the predictive power of ASSET and LEV for 
excess market returns is not qualitatively different.  Importantly, cay loses its predictive power 
for excess market returns in the presence of LEV.   
By contrast, unreported results show that INV has no short-run predictability for excess 
market returns. That is, INV cannot predict excess market returns as well as intermediation 
factors do.  BH report that productivity state has 12- and 16-quarters-ahead predictive power for 
excess market returns.  While the BH result is important, forecasters may care about short-run 
rather than long-run predictability.  However, BH report that productivity state-squared, has 
one-quarter-ahead forecasting power for excess market returns. 
Unreported results show that BDLEV, the leverage factor of Adrian et al. (2012) cannot 
predict market returns.   
To check the robustness, we also conduct one-quarter-ahead predictability of the single 
market return realization by intermediation factors.  The procedure is described below. 
Since ASSET and other intermediation factors are highly correlated with excess market 
returns, a large part of the excess market return can be explained by the expected value of 
intermediation factors.  In other words, we may know the expected part of excess market 
returns, but we don’t know the unexpected part.  As a result, we consider a moving average of 
intermediation factors as proxies for the expected part of excess market returns, and then run a 
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predictive regression of the following form to estimate the unexpected part:  
R𝑡, 𝐾𝑇
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑡−1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−4
𝑓 + 𝛽𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝜀    (16) 
where 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑡−1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−4
𝑓  is the moving average of an intermediation factor f over four 
quarters t-1 through t-4, and the excess market returns realization is R𝑡, 𝐾𝑇
 .  That is, the 
expected value of intermediation factors measured over four quarters captures the expected 
excess market returns for the next quarter.  The unexpected part of excess market returns next 
quarter can be predicted by the current quarter intermediation factor.  In the regressions, we also 
control for TERM, CREDIT, and cay.  
The estimates of α and β are reported for the one-quarter-ahead-forecasts in Table 2.5 
Panel B.  The results show ASSET and LEV maintains their predictive power for excess market 
returns.  While cay remains an important predictor variable for excess market returns along 
with ASSET, LEV consumes the predictive power of all control variables including cay.   
We replicate the results of Table 2.5 Panel B with INV, PF1 and PF2, and the unreported 
results show that these factors do not have the same property as ASSET or LEV.  The plausible 
reason is that either the moving average of these factors cannot capture the expected part of 
excess market returns or one-lag of these factors cannot predict the unexpected part of excess 
market returns.  In the short-run, the results thus suggest that the existing investment or 
productivity factors can predict neither the moving average of excess market returns nor the 
excess market realization.    
To summarize, overall evidences from the above analyses suggest that intermediation 
factors behave as state variables in predicting market excess returns.  The factors explain the 
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value and size premiums.  Additionally, stocks are found to be more sensitive to systematic 
intermediation risk than systematic stock market risk.  Importantly, competing investment and 
productivity factors have very limited power for the stylized asset pricing tests.  Additionally, 
the leverage of securities brokers and dealers as a factor fails stylized asset pricing tests, and 
hence we do not consider this factor for the rest of the analysis.     
 
2.4.5 The cross section of stock returns  
In this section, we investigate whether the intermediation factors help explain the observed cross-
sectional variation in average stock returns.  Equation (10) can be written in the familiar beta 
form
20
 as 
R𝑖,𝑡
 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,f𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (17) 
where R𝑖,𝑡
  excess stock returns and f represents factors that explain stock returns.  
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we estimate betas for each explanatory variable in a time 
series regression using the sample of each asset’s returns using equation (17).  Next, we run 
cross-sectional regression at every date t of the following equation 
R𝑖,𝑡
 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑓,𝑡𝛽𝑖,𝑓         (18) 
Following Savov (2011), we do not include a free constant term to run cross-sectional 
regressions of the above equation.  Savov (2011) observes that the inclusion of a free constant 
gives the model more freedom but it leads to poor factor premia estimates.  The estimates of 
factor premia become more problematic when there are little variations in betas across time.  
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 Literature (e.g., Jagannathan and Wang (2002), among others) shows that a linear beta representation of 
expected returns is equivalent to a linear factor model for the stochastic discount factor. 
77 
 
 
 
Additionally, employing Fama-French 25 size and book-to-market portfolios as test assets often 
gives the market premia to be negative (e.g., Balvars and Huang (2007) and Jagannathan and 
Wang (2007)).  The regression results with a free constant also imply counterintuitive nonzero 
excess returns for risk-free rate.  The specification also conforms to one of the specifications of 
Jagannathan and Wang (2007). 
Finally, we calculate the average of the estimated premia and pricing error across time as 
𝜆𝑓 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝜆𝑓,𝑡,
𝑇
0  𝛼𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
0        (19) 
The model (18) predicts that 𝜆 > 0 and 𝛼 = 0 for every asset.  Following literature, we 
use the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios as test assets and Table 2.6 presents 
the Fama MacBeth regressions results. While Panel A presents unconditional estimates of factor 
premia along with the CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor models, Panel B presents regressions 
results for conditional models.   
Looking at Table 2.6 Panel A, it is evident that all models are rejected.  Except for INV, 
all factors gets a positive premium.  The quarterly pricing errors are about 0.9% for MKT, 
ASSET and LEV.  The lowest pricing error is observed for the Fama-French 3-factor model 
(model 7).  All other unconditional models have higher pricing errors than that of MKT, ASSET 
and LEV.   
The quarterly-factor-premia estimates and pricing errors for the models 6 and 7 are of the 
same order as the yearly-factor-premia estimates reported in Savov (2011) for MKT and Fama-
French 3-factor models.  Since we do not use a free constant in cross-sectional tests, the results 
ascertain that our results are similar to that of Savov’s (2011).  
78 
 
 
 
Looking at the investment-based model, the negative sign for INV is consistent with the 
theory that postulates the expected sign for ‘investment beta’ to be negative.  However, judging 
by the pricing errors, PF1 and PF2 are better than INV, and the results are consistent with the BH 
results.   
Looking at the first column of Table 2.6 Panel B, where INV and ASSET are included in 
the model (model 9), both INV and ASSET gets positive premium. While the quarterly premium 
for INV changes from -8.23% (Model 1) to 6.78% (model 9), the quarterly premium for ASSET 
doubles from 0.56% to 1.07%.  Unreported results show that the root cause of such a variation 
in risk premia estimates is the high correlation (81%) between INV and ASSET ‘betas’ that are 
obtained in the first-stage of the Fama-Macbeth regression. That is, multi-colinearity in the 
second-stage invalidates the factor premia estimates. Alternately, the result shows that both INV 
and ASSET has similar information about the riskiness of the economy. 
Now turning to pricing errors, the unconditional INV (model 1) model has 1.04% 
quarterly pricing error, and the pricing error reduces in the conditional version of the model 
(model 9) to 0.95%.  By contrast, the unconditional ASSET model has far lower pricing error of 
0.90%.  Thus, the results suggest a parsimonious one factor ASSET model is superior to both 
the unconditional INV and encompassing conditional models.  We do not report the factor 
premia for the interaction term between INV and ASSET since it is insignificant.     
Looking at the model 10 of Table 2.6 Panel B, which is the conditional model of BH, the 
results show that the factor premia of productivity based models with the expected sign.  BH 
report factor premiums for PF1 and PF2 to be 0.869 and -0.510 respectively.  The estimates 
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presented in this paper are 0.935 and -0.445 respectively, and thus the estimates are similar to 
that of BH.
21
  
In the model 11, we include ASSET as an additional factor along with productivity 
factors.  While PF1 maintains its importance, PF2 and ASSET lose their significance.  
Unreported results show that PF2 and ASSET betas, which are obtained in the first-stage of the 
Fama-Macbeth regression, are highly correlated (the correlation is about 72%).  Hence, the 
factor premia estimates are not robust in this model.  Now turning attention to the pricing 
errors, it is evident that the addition of ASSET to the conditional productivity model does not 
increase the explanatory power of the model.  The pricing error of the conditional productivity 
model is 0.95, which is higher than that of the unconditional ASSET model, and hence one factor 
ASSET model is superior to both the productivity-based and the encompassing intermediary-
augmented-productivity models.   
The results presented above show that the intermediary funding specific component 
dominates the firm specific component in determining asset returns given by equation (7).  For 
a given technology, production processes requires capital, and labor is chosen optimally based on 
capital.  The capital can either be raised from internally generated profits or be raised by 
combining the external funds and internally generated profits.  Since the external funds, 
represented by intermediary balance sheet growth, are more volatile relative to INV, the net 
effect of internal and external funds, INV produces more pricing errors.  Additionally, external 
funds are procyclical, and hence are more aligned with the asset prices.  Thus intermediation 
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 BH do not estimate factor premia directly, instead they report implied factor premia. 
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factors produce less pricing errors in explaining stock returns.   
When BH factors are compared head-to-head, however, the intermediation factors 
perform better.  The reason is that productivity does not vary considerably from one quarter to 
another, that is, the volatility of productivity is not as large as funds from intermediaries.  
Additionally, productivity factors have far lower correlation with excess market returns than that 
for the intermediation factors.  From the economic perspective, while firm productivity 
determines asset prices, forward-looking stock market measures expected asset prices. The 
realization of the productivity state thus lags behind the market expectation. 
On the contrary, intermediaries are forced to adjust their balance-sheets in tandem with 
the market expectation of asset prices.  Hence, the funds they provide closely follow the 
forward-looking market, and productivity lags behind intermediaries’ funding in capturing the 
dynamics of asset returns.  The manifestation of the economic dynamics is reflected in the data.  
While productivity factors are less volatile and have lower correlation with excess market 
returns, the intermediation factors are more volatile and have higher correlation with excess 
market returns.  Thus, the intermediation factors price assets better than productivity factors.        
 
2.4.5.1 The CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor models  
Having investigated the interaction between intermediation-based factors and existing 
investment-based and productivity-based models, we now investigate how intermediation-based 
factors compares with the CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor models. 
In the model 11 of Table 2.6 Panel B, we estimate the factors premia where MKT and 
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ASSET are the two factors.  The result shows high significant negative premium for ASSET.  
The results are similar when ASSET is an additional factor in the Fama-French 3-factor model 
(model 13).  The reason is the high correlation between ASSET and MKT (60% correlation 
with the raw data and more than 90% correlation of factor ‘betas’ after the first-stage Fama-
Macbeth regression).  However, one could ask the question why ASSET estimates lose their 
explanatory power in the presence of MKT?  The answer is the volatility of the factors.  
ASSET is far less volatile than MKT.  As a result, OLS pays more attention to the higher 
frequency MKT data than to the lower frequency ASSET data to fit stock returns.  Nevertheless, 
a high correlation of explanatory variables, and hence the presence multi-collinearity nullifies 
any conclusion that could be drawn from the model 11 specification.   
To investigate the conjecture that the data frequency is the root cause of the failure of 
ASSET, in the model 14, we replace MKT with ASSET in the 3-factor Fama-French model.  
The rationale for a model that consists of ASSET, SMB, and HML is discussed in sub-section 
4.2, where it was shown that ASSET loads the value and size portfolios exactly the same way 
MKT does.  In the model 14, ASSET gets a robust premium, and the difference in pricing errors 
between the model 14 and model 8 is 0.001%.  This implies that along with the SMB and HML 
factors, ASSET explains the cross-section of returns as well as the Fama-French 3-factor model 
does.  The results further imply that MKT and ASSET have similar information about the 
systematic risks that investors encounter in the marketplace.   
We repeat the experiment with EQUITY in models 15 and 16.  In the model 15, the 
inclusion of EQUITY in Fama-French 3-factor model, EQUITY gets a negative premium.  
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However, in the model 16, where EQUITY replaces MKT, EQUITY gets a positive premium.  
As a result, the model 16 supports the conjecture that intermediaries’ balance-sheet variables 
have information that captures the information content of the market portfolio.   
 
2.4.5.2 Robustness with larger sets of test assets   
We include 10 industry portfolios as test assets to address the Lewellen, Nigel, and Shanken 
(2010) critique that 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios are too structured.  
Since asset pricing tests often find it demanding to explain 30 industry portfolios, we also 
include 30 industry portfolios to 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios for 
robustness checks. 
The results by including 10 industry portfolios to the size and book-to-market portfolios 
are presented in Table 2.7.  All models are rejected and the pricing errors are wider than that for 
25 size and book-to-market portfolios.  Other than the pricing error difference and except for 
the model 10, the results are qualitatively similar to the results presented earlier.  Importantly, 
the 3-factor ASSET, SMB, and HML (model 14) model performs as well as the Fama French 3-
factor model does.     
The BH model predicts that the factor premium for PF2 to be negative, the model 10 
shows it is positive.  Moreover, productivity factors premia are very different from the 
estimated premia from 25 size and book-to-market portfolios as test assets.  In contrast, factor 
premia estimates for intermediation factors, INV, and MKT remains relatively unaffected.   
To ascertain that the factors get premium with more diversified test assets, we include 30 
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industry portfolios to 25 size and book-to-market portfolios.  However, as opposed to the 
factors considered earlier, we only include ASSET, MKT, SMB and HML.  The specification 
allows for concentrating on the relationship between portfolio-based factors and intermediation 
factors.  We omit other intermediation factors since the results are not qualitatively different 
from the results for ASSET.  Unreported results further show that the conclusion about INV or 
PF1 and PF2 does not change with the larger set of test assets.  The exclusion of PF1 and PF2 
also allows for investigating the relationship with the larger data set that spans from 1955-2009.     
Looking from the left, in model 1 of Table 2.8, ASSET as a sole factor gets a robust high 
and significant premium.  The premium is not affected adversely with the inclusion of the HML 
and the SMB factors as seen in the model 4.  The same conclusion emerges when MKT is the 
sole factor (model 2) or in model 3, where the HML and the SMB are additional factors.   
A factor has economic significance.  The factor beta may be time-varying but the 
significance and corresponding premium, to a large extent, should be independent of the choice 
of test assets.  When compared head-to-head with different sets of test assets with different 
samples, only two factors that emerges to be significant are MKT and ASSET.    
In essence, the investigation above tells us that asset growths of intermediaries have 
similar information as the market in explaining a wide variety of assets returns.  That is, 
intermediation risk, that we proxy for by the fluctuations of intermediaries’ balance sheet, and 
stock market risk, which is a proxy for by the market portfolio, seems to capture the same 
information.   
We conduct further robustness checks.  First, we investigate whether value-weighted 
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asset growths of intermediaries collect a positive risk premium.  Second, we investigate 
whether asset-growths of intermediaries by themselves explain asset returns in the cross-section.  
The results by considering the value-weighted asset growths of intermediaries or asset growths 
of each intermediary as factors do not change the conclusion of the empirical results.   
The intermediation risk can be best measured when the riskiness of each constituent 
intermediaries are given equal weights.  Since one intermediary acts as counterparty for others, 
intermediaries are interconnected.  As a result, a possibility of the failure of one intermediary 
triggers the possibility of the failure of others.  Examples of interconnectivity or the contagion 
effect among intermediaries are abundant.  The recent sub-prime mortgage crisis show how 
delinquencies and foreclosure of a fraction of the total sub-prime mortgages translated into a full-
blown global financial crisis.  Thus, the fluctuations of the total money flow, represented by the 
aggregated growth of assets, from intermediaries are most important to gauge the systematic 
intermediation risk.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we derive an intermediation-augment investment-based asset pricing model.  The 
existing investment-based asset pricing models assume that firms have excess to external 
financing at some cost, and that financially constrained firms relative to less constrained firms 
pay more for external funds.  That is, the underlying assumption of the existing literature is that 
the external funds supply is elastic.  We relax the assumption by arguing that firms may not be 
able to raise any external fund if financial intermediaries are themselves constrained.  As a 
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direct consequence, firm managers work under the uncertainty of external funds.  Hence, 
systematic financial intermediation risk has asset pricing implications. 
We contribute to the literature by showing that the exiting investment-based asset pricing 
models, such as Cochrane’s (1991 and 1996), are a special case of a general asset pricing kernel.  
The intermediation-augmented investment-based model predicts that the marginal funding that 
intermediaries provide explains stock returns.  The results suggest that intermediation factors 
outweigh existing investment- and productivity-based factors in explaining stock returns.  We 
further show that stocks are more sensitive to systematic intermediation risk than systematic 
stock market risk.  We also find that intermediation factors are priced in the cross-section.    
Literature (Gomes et al. (2006), Whited and Wu (2007), Campello and Chen (2010), 
among others) find evidence that financial constraints are priced factors.  However, we find 
evidences that intermediation risk systematically affects firms whether firms are financially 
constrained or not.  We further show that the shadow price and the risk of securing external 
funds coexist.  It is thus reasonable to investigate whether and to what extent the shadow price 
of external funds is related to systematic intermediation risk.  We leave the task for future 
research.       
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Appendix 2.A: The derivation of investment returns 
This appendix derives equation (6) of the essay.  The firm managers maximize  
V(𝐾0, Ω0, 𝐵0 , 𝜁0) ≡ max{𝐾𝑡+1} 𝐸0[∑ M0𝑡(𝐷𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡Ω(𝐾𝑡 , 𝜁𝑡))
∞
𝑡=0 ]       (A.1) 
𝐷𝑡 = Π(𝐾𝑡 , 𝜁𝑡) + Ω(𝐾𝑡 , 𝜁𝑡)(𝑋𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1) − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡Ω(𝐾𝑡−1, 𝜁𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡 −
α
2
[
𝐼𝑡
𝐾𝑡
]2𝐾𝑡      (A.2) 
capital accumulates as  K𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡       (A.3) 
the dividend constraint is  𝐷𝑡 ≥ ?̅?        (A.4) 
where, K is the capital stock, Π[.] is the profit function, Ω[.] is the fund allocation 
function that determines the external fund supplied by intermediaries, X and B is new equity and 
debt issued, 𝑋𝑡Ω(𝐾𝑡 , 𝜁𝑡) captures the value dilution effect after equity issuance, M0𝑡 is stochastic 
discount factor between time 0 to time 1, I is investments, δ is depreciation, α is curvature of 
adjustment cost function, 𝜁 captures all sorts of uncertainties.  
Given (A.1) through (A.4), the Lagrangian conditional on the information set at time t is 
given below, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the dividend constraint.   
L𝑡 = ⋯+𝑀0𝑡(1 + 𝜆𝑡){ Π(𝐾𝑡 , 𝜁𝑡) + Ω(𝐾𝑡 , 𝜁𝑡)(𝐵𝑡+1)−𝑅𝑡Ω(𝐾𝑡−1, 𝜁𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡 − [
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
− (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 −
𝛼
2
[
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
−
(1 − 𝛿)]
2
𝐾𝑡} + 𝐸𝑡[𝑀0𝑡+1(1 + 𝜆𝑡+1) { Π(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝜁𝑡+1) + Ω(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝜁𝑡+1)(𝐵𝑡+2)−𝑅𝑡+1Ω(𝐾𝑡 , 𝜁𝑡)𝐵𝑡+1 − [
𝐾𝑡+2
𝐾𝑡+1
−
(1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+1 −
𝛼
2
[
𝐾𝑡+2
𝐾𝑡+1
− (1 − 𝛿)]
2
𝐾𝑡+1}] + ⋯      (A.5) 
The first order condition with respect to 𝐾𝑡+1 , that is, 
𝛿𝐿𝑡
𝛿𝐾𝑡+1
= 0, implies  
𝑀0𝑡(1 + 𝜆𝑡)(1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡)  = 𝐸𝑡[𝑀0𝑡+1(1 + 𝜆𝑡+1) (Π𝐾+1 + Ω𝐾+1(𝐵𝑡+2) +
𝛼
2
[𝑖𝑡+1
2 + (1 − 𝛿)] (1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡+1) (A.6) 
where,  𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡⁄ ,  Π𝑘+1 = δΠ(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝜁𝑡+1) 𝛿𝐾𝑡+1⁄ , and  Ω𝑘+1 = δΩ(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝜁𝑡+1) 𝛿𝐾𝑡+1⁄ . 
Simplifying equation (A.6), and using 𝐸 [
 0𝑡+1
 0𝑡
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐼 ] = 𝐸[𝑀𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1
𝐼 ] = 1, we get equation (6). 
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Appendix 2.B: Construction of productivity factors of Balvers and Huang (2007) 
 
The conditional (𝜖𝑡|𝜃𝑡 and 𝑘𝑡) and unconditional (𝜖𝑡) productivity shocks described in sub-section 
2.2. are constructed as follows.  Following King and Rebelo (2000), the level of 
productivity 𝜃𝑡  is constructed by 2/3 weight of labor and 1/3 weight of capital.  Since the state 
variables productivity and capital  𝜃𝑡  and 𝑘𝑡 are cointegrated,  𝜖𝑡 is calculated by first 
differencing log(𝜃𝑡) and then subtracting the mean.  Then, 𝜖𝑡 is whitened by regressing 𝜖𝑡 on 
lags of 𝜃𝑡  and 𝑘𝑡 since both capital and productivity lags are correlated with 𝜖𝑡.  Following 
Sims et al. (1990), the cointegrating residuals (of 𝜃𝑡  and 𝑘𝑡) are used as the state, 𝑠𝑡.  The 
productivity state measures relative scarcity of capital in the economy – the level of the existing 
capital relative to productivity.  The conditional shocks  𝜖𝑡|𝜃𝑡 and 𝑘𝑡 are derived by 
multiplying  𝜖𝑡 and  𝑠𝑡 .  PF1 and PF2 represent the unconditional ( 𝜖𝑡) and conditional 
( 𝜖𝑡|𝜃𝑡 and 𝑘𝑡 ) productivity shocks respectively.  
Appendix 2.C: The proof that the SDF is inversely proportional to investment returns  
 
This appendix shows investment and the stochastic discount factor are inversely related.  Since 
the derivation is standard, we keep the derivation as parsimonious as possible. 
Under the Cobb-Douglas production function, the consumption-investment model is as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑗[∑ 𝛽
𝑗ln (𝑐𝑗)
∞
𝑗=0 ],  subject to 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
𝛼  and 𝑙𝑛𝜆𝑡 = 𝜌𝑙𝑛𝜆𝑡−1. 
The investment return is 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 = 𝛼𝜆𝑡+1𝑖𝑡
𝛼−1 = 𝛼𝑦𝑡+1/𝑖𝑡.   
Hence, the solutions are 𝑐𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛽)𝑦𝑡, and 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽𝑦𝑡.   
Substituting 𝑐𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 in investment returns yields, 𝑟𝑡
𝑖 =
1
𝛽
𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
=
1
𝑚𝑡+1
. 
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Figure 2.1 
Time series of intermediaries’ asset-growth, investment-returns, and 
productivity shocks 
This figure shows the time series of quarterly investments returns, productivity shocks, and the growth of 
intermediaries’ assets for six intermediary groups (commercial banks, mutual funds, securities brokers and dealers, 
retirement/pension funds, insurance companies, and shadow-banks).  The first plot compares investment returns 
(INV) and the growth of intermediaries’ financial assets (ASSET) for the sample 1955 through 2009.  The second 
plot compares productivity shocks (PF1) and ASSET for the sample 1964 through 2004.  Gray bands indicate 
NBER recessions.  All series are standardized for the ease of comparison.  
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Figure 2.2 
Procyclical leverage of Intermediaries  
The figure shows the scatter plot of the leverage growth versus the asset growth for intermediaries. The 
intermediaries are described in Table 2.1. The data is from the Federal Flow of Funds for 1955-2009.  The figure 
also plots the regression line.  
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Table 2.1 
Financial Intermediaries and their assets 
This table describes the intermediaries.  Quarterly asset data is obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds 
for the 1955-2009 sample period.   
 
Financial Intermediaries  
Intermediary Group Members Assets (US$ trillions) by Group 
  
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Insurance Companies Life Insurance 1.64 0.65 1.90 0.08 6.36 
 
Property and Casualty Insurance 
     
       Pension Funds Private Pension Funds 2.59 0.79 3.21 0.02 10.99 
 
Federal Govt. Retirement Funds 
     
 
State Govt. Retirement Funds 
     
       Banks Commercial Banks 3.95 2.34 4.23 0.20 16.86 
 
Credit Unions 
     
 
Savings Institutions 
     
       Shadow-banks Asset Backed Securities 2.42 0.34 3.70 0.01 13.79 
 
Agency/GSE Mortgage Pools 
     
 
Funding Corporations 
     
 
Finance Companies 
     
       Mutual Funds Money Market Funds 1.97 0.15 3.10 0.01 11.18 
 
Mutual Funds 
     
 
Closed End Funds 
     
 
Exchange Traded Funds 
     
       Securities Brokers & Dealers Securities Brokers & Dealers 0.46 0.05 0.77 0.00 3.24 
       Total Assets   16.98 6.65 20.91 0.53 73.66 
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Table 2.2 
Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the factors considered for the study: market excess returns (MKT), the 
growth of financial assets (ASSET), the growth of liability (LIAB), the growth of leverage (LEV), the growth of 
equity (EQUITY), excess returns on investments (INV), and Balvers and Huang’s (2007) unconditional and 
conditional productivity shocks (PF1 and PF2, respectively), where the conditioning variable is the productivity 
state derived from the cointegrating residuals of productivity and labor.  Panel A presents sample moments, 
correlation of the factors with MKT, and pairwise correlation between the factors. Panel B presents the auto-
correlation structure of intermediation factors. P-values are in the parenthesis.  
 
Panel A: Sample moments 
 
INV PF1 PF2 ASSET LIAB EQUITY LEV 
        
Mean 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.023 1.003 1.020 1.002 
Std. dev. (X100) 4.233 0.766 0.411 1.357 1.088 1.267 1.173 
Corr. MKT -0.068 0.312 0.242 0.614 0.705 0.052 0.636 
 
(0.388) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.445) (0.000) 
        
INV -0.140 0.007 0.119 0.065 -0.205 -0.089 
  
(0.075) (0.925) (0.132) (0.408) (0.009) (0.259) 
PF1 
 
0.331 0.138 0.142 -0.090 0.067 
   
(0.000) (0.079) (0.071) (0.255) (0.392) 
PF2 
  
0.137 0.131 -0.128 0.022 
    
(0.081) (0.095) (0.103) (0.782) 
ASSET 
    
0.967 0.592 0.478 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIAB 
     
0.377 0.675 
      
(0.000) (0.000) 
EQUITY 
     
-0.425 
       
(0.000) 
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Panel B: Auto-correlation Structure of Intermediary’s Balance-Sheet Variables 
  
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 
       ASSET 
 
0.072 0.215 0.049 0.257 -0.058 
  
(0.296) (0.002) (0.476) (0.000) (0.411) 
LIAB 
 
0.104 0.189 0.058 0.177 -0.050 
  
(0.136) (0.007) (0.404) (0.012) (0.491) 
EQUITY 0.241 0.171 -0.153 0.423 -0.088 
  
(0.001) (0.009) (0.024) (0.000) (0.234) 
LEV 
 
0.232 0.120 0.002 0.067 -0.082 
    (0.001) (0.095) (0.976) (0.375) (0.305) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 
Factor loadings on Fama-French 25 Size and Book-to-Market portfolios 
This table presents factor loadings on 25 Size and Book-to-Market portfolios where R𝑖,𝑗
  is excess returns of Size and 
Book-to-Market portfolios, 𝑅𝑋 is excess return if factors are returns, else 𝑅𝑋 is growth or the factor itself.  Panel A 
presents factor loadings of MKT and ASSET.  Panel B presents factor loading of INV. Panel C presents factor 
loading of LIAB and LEV. Panel D presents factor loading differentials between extreme portfolios. Panel E 
presents factor loadings of BDLEV, the leverage factor of Adrian et al. (2012) measured from securities brokers and 
dealers’ leverage. Estimates of b, factor loadings, and t(b), the corresponding t-statistics, are reported. Since BDLEV 
data is available from 1968-2009, Panel E present results for this sub-sample.   
 
Panel A: Loadings on excess returns of Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios  
 R𝑖,𝑗
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑗𝑅𝑋 + 𝜀 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝑀𝐾𝑇 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small 1.56 1.35 1.17 1.11 1.21 
 
20.9 23.39 19.46 18.79 16.65 
2 1.48 1.24 1.09 1.05 1.14 
 
24.12 24.59 21.71 20.13 16.42 
3 1.36 1.13 1.01 1.00 1.02 
 
25.18 28.03 19.77 17.51 14.67 
4 1.26 1.07 1.01 0.99 1.08 
 
25.82 23.91 20.32 18.76 13.93 
Big 1.02 0.92 0.80 0.82 0.88 
 
41.31 29.66 20.47 16.16 15.39 
            𝑅𝑋 = 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small 5.70 4.73 3.69 3.49 3.76 
 
7.25 7.87 7.51 7.45 6.75 
2 5.28 4.24 3.76 3.46 3.59 
 
8.48 9.05 9.05 7.24 6.79 
3 5.14 4.08 3.49 3.20 3.21 
 
9.40 9.20 8.26 6.67 5.99 
4 4.94 3.94 3.64 3.55 3.57 
 
8.60 9.15 8.22 8.30 6.83 
Big 4.00 3.65 3.25 3.00 3.28 
 
9.97 10.49 9.19 7.46 7.65 
 
Panel B: Loadings on excess returns of Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios 
 R𝑖,𝑗
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑗𝑅𝑋 + 𝜀 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small -0.46 -0.32 -0.25 -0.16 -0.20 
 
-2.05 -1.67 -1.48 -1.01 -1.11 
2 -0.40 -0.25 -0.16 -0.15 -0.10 
 
-2.06 -1.51 -1.10 -1.02 -0.60 
3 -0.26 -0.15 -0.14 -0.18 -0.16 
 
-1.47 -1.03 -1.02 -1.32 -1.07 
4 -0.27 -0.15 -0.09 -0.16 -0.20 
 
-1.70 -1.12 -0.70 -1.17 -1.29 
Big -0.14 -0.13 -0.08 0.01 -0.10 
 
-1.11 -1.11 -0.78 0.08 -0.77 
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Table 2.3 continued 
 
 
 
Panel C: Loadings on excess returns of Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios 
  R𝑖,𝑗
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑗𝑅𝑋 + 𝜀 
 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵 
Size 
Quintile 
Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small 5.87 4.93 4.00 3.75 4.12 
 
9.78 10.4 9.64 8.81 7.88 
2 5.50 4.47 3.98 3.73 3.90 
 
11.74 11.13 10.59 8.68 7.54 
3 5.34 4.31 3.66 3.48 3.48 
 
13.20 11.98 9.06 7.68 7.02 
4 5.07 4.10 3.84 3.73 3.89 
 
12.42 10.51 9.12 9.13 7.78 
Big 4.09 3.76 3.36 3.19 3.41 
 
14.37 12.87 11.27 8.11 8.58 
            
 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝐿𝐸𝑉 
Size 
Quintile 
Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small 6.66 5.67 4.90 4.52 5.50 
 
8.25 8.53 7.92 6.84 7.70 
2 6.23 5.09 4.65 4.36 4.95 
 
8.66 8.47 8.75 6.97 6.87 
3 6.09 4.95 4.20 4.43 4.35 
 
9.47 8.62 7.44 7.6 6.25 
4 5.60 4.71 4.50 4.41 4.87 
 
9.13 7.98 7.35 7.11 7.32 
Big 4.48 4.14 3.88 3.75 3.83 
 
9.48 9.55 9.13 7.51 7.24 
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Table 2.3 continued 
 
 
 
Panel D: Factor Loading Differentials 
 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 
Size 
Quintile 
Low High H-L   Low High H-L 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small 5.70 3.76 1.93 
 
7.25 6.75 3.29 
Big 4.00 3.28 0.72 
 
9.97 7.65 2.17 
S-B 1.70 0.48     3.20 1.95   
 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝐿𝐸𝑉 
Size 
Quintile 
Low High H-L   Low High H-L 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small 6.66 5.50 1.16 
 
6.79 7.25 2.61 
Big 4.48 3.83 0.65 
 
8.05 6.51 1.44 
S-B 2.18 1.67     3.27 2.88   
 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝐸 𝑈𝐼𝑇  
Size 
Quintile 
Low High H-L   Low High H-L 
 
b 
 
t(b) 
Small 9.13 7.78 1.35 
 
6.79 7.25 1.78 
Big 5.95 4.98 0.97 
 
8.05 6.51 1.52 
S-B 3.18 2.80     3.01 4.01   
 
 
Panel E: Loadings on excess returns of Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios 
 R𝑖,𝑗
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑗𝑅𝑋 + 𝜀 
𝑅𝑋 = 𝐵𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉 
Size Quintile Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
 
b (X100) 
 
t(b) 
Small 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 
 
0.65 1.06 1.69 1.90 2.03 
2 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 
 
0.54 1.59 2.09 2.17 2.62 
3 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
 
0.64 1.54 1.94 2.02 2.20 
4 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 
0.69 1.61 1.80 2.25 2.03 
Big 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 
0.75 1.24 1.40 2.28 2.46 
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Table 2.4 
Explaining Fama-French SMB and HML factors 
The table presents the explanatory power of intermediation factors for the SMB and HML factors. Panel A shows the 
explanation for the SMB factor. Panel B presents the explanation for the HML factor.  Explanatory variables are 
described earlier.  T-statistics are in the parenthesis.  The sample is from 1964:Q2-2004:Q4, since PF1 and PF2 
data are available for this period only. T-statistics are in the parenthesis. 
 
Panel A 
Dependent: SMB 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ASSET 0.92 
  
  
0.97 0.78 
    
 
(3.10) 
  
  
(3.10) (2.33) 
    LEV 
 
1.39  
  
  
1.36 1.31 
  
  
(3.49)  
  
  
(3.52) (3.36) 
  EQUITY 
 
 
3.86 
  
  
  
3.80 3.58 
  
 
(3.45) 
  
  
  
(3.48) (3.13) 
INV 
   
-0.10 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.05 
 
    
(-0.78) 
 
(-1.01) 
 
(-0.56) 
 
(-0.40) 
 PF1 
    
1.64 
 
1.50 
 
1.51 
 
1.47 
     
(2.30) 
 
(2.10) 
 
(2.32) 
 
(2.33) 
PF2 
    
0.87 
 
0.60 
 
0.87 
 
0.77 
 
    
(0.63) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.66) 
 
(0.61) 
?̅?2 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 
 
Panel B 
Dependent: HML 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ASSET -1.50 
  
  
-1.59 -1.53 
  
  
 
(-2.42) 
  
  
(-2.51) (-2.52) 
  
  
LEV 
 
-1.52 
 
  
  
-1.46 -1.54 
  
 
 
(-2.47) 
 
  
  
(-2.37) (-2.47) 
  
EQUITY 
 
 
-3.70 
  
    
-3.50 -3.75 
 
 
 
(-2.74) 
  
    
(-2.55) (-2.75) 
INV 
 
 
 
0.20 
 
0.26 
 
0.17 
 
0.16 
 
  
 
 
(1.81) 
 
(2.64) 
 
(1.47) 
 
(1.31) 
 PF1 
  
 
 
0.37 
 
0.65 
 
0.52 
 
0.55 
   
 
 
(0.55) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(0.83) 
 
(0.87) 
PF2 
  
 
 
-0.97 
 
-0.45 
 
-0.97 
 
-0.86 
     
(-0.69) 
 
(-0.37) 
 
(-0.72) 
 
(-0.64) 
?̅?2 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 
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Table 2.5 
Predicting excess market returns 
This table shows the predictability of excess market returns by intermediation factors.  Panel A presents prediction 
of 4-quarter moving average of excess market returns for different forecast horizons by intermediation factors.  
Panel B presents one-quarter-ahead prediction of excess market realization by intermediation factors, where lags of 
additional predictive variables the term-spread, the difference between the yields on 10-year Treasuries and 3-month 
T-bills (TERM), the default premium, the difference between the yields on Moody’s Aaa and Moody’s Baa bonds 
(CREDIT), and cay, the consumption to wealth ratio of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) are used as controls. P-values 
are in the parenthesis.   
  
 
Panel A: Predicting the moving average of excess market returns  
MVA𝑡, 𝐾𝑇
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀 
 
ASSET 
 
LEV 
 
EQUITY 
 
Est.β p-value 
 
 
Est.β p-value 
 
 
Est.β p-value 
 
Forecast Quarters  
           1 0.49 0.00 0.06 
 
0.88 0.00 0.10 
 
0.05 0.75 -0.03 
2 0.40 0.00 0.02 
 
0.81 0.00 0.08 
 
0.20 0.07 -0.04 
3 0.54 0.00 0.03 
 
0.96 0.00 0.07 
 
0.10 0.45 0.88 
4 -0.29 0.00 0.01 
 
-0.46 0.00 0.01 
 
0.25 0.15 -0.04 
5 -0.39 0.14 0.01 
 
0.01 0.96 0.01 
 
0.24 0.16 -0.03 
 
 
 
Panel B: One-quarter-ahead predictability of the excess market returns realization 
R𝑡, 𝐾𝑇
 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑡−4 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1
𝑓
+ 𝛽𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝜀 
 
ASSET 
 
LEV 
 
EQUITY 
Est.α 2.59 3.18 
 
5.27 5.11 
 
0.71 -0.24 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.32) (0.78) 
Est.β -0.85 -0.81 
 
-2.05 -1.89 
 
-0.12 0.00 
 
(0.10) (0.10) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.84) (1.00) 
TERM 
 
0.01 
  
0.01 
  
0.01 
 
 
(0.38) 
  
(0.30) 
  
(0.32) 
CREDIT 
 
0.02 
  
0.01 
  
0.01 
 
 
(0.36) 
  
(0.37) 
  
(0.45) 
cay 
 
1.31 
  
0.30 
  
1.08 
 
 
(0.00) 
  
(0.47) 
  
(0.03) 
?̅?2 0.05 0.10 
 
0.06 0.09 
 
-0.01 0.04 
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Table 2.6 
Fama MacBeth Regressions on 25 Size & Value Portfolios 
The factor premia are estimated following Fama MacBeth cross-sectional procedure. There is no cross-
sectional intercept.  Pricing errors are the root mean squared errors with associated p-value are in the 
parenthesis for the hypothesis that all pricing errors are zero. Three-lag Newey-West t-statistics are in the 
parenthesis for factor premia estimates. Panel A presents unconditional estimates along with the Fama-
French 3-factor model.  Panel B presents conditional models.  Sample 1964:Q1-2004:Q4.     
 
Panel A: Factor Premium of unconditional and Fama-French 3-factor model 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
INV -8.299 
  
     
 
(-2.160) 
  
     
         PF1 
 
0.518 
 
     
 
 
(3.060) 
 
     
         PF2 
  
0.403 
     
 
  
(2.960) 
     
         LEV 
   
0.439 
    
    
(3.190) 
    
         ASSET 
    
0.535 
   
     
(3.150) 
   
         EQUITY 
     
3.573 
  
      
(2.720) 
  
         MKT 
      
1.925 1.534 
       
(3.190) (2.690) 
         SMB 
       
0.658 
        
(1.560) 
         HML 
       
1.625 
        
(3.160) 
         Pricing Error 1.038 0.957 0.962 0.901 0.904 0.956 0.900 0.878 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2.6 continued 
 
Panel B: Factor Premium of conditional models 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
INV 6.777 
  
     
 
(3.310) 
  
     
         ASSET 1.074 
 
0.046 -0.924 -1.060 0.374 
  
 
(4.050) 
 
(0.260) (-2.750) (-3.650) (2.370) 
  
         PF1 
 
0.935 1.008 
     
  
(4.140) (3.670) 
     
         PF2 
 
-0.445 -0.309 
     
  
(-2.100) (-1.590) 
     
         EQUITY 
      
-1.660 1.701 
       
(-4.880) (1.930) 
         MKT 
   
1.192 1.462 
 
1.479 
 
    
(2.080) (2.540) 
 
(2.580) 
 
         SMB 
    
0.592 0.718 0.759 1.126 
     
(1.390) (1.720) (1.810) (2.760) 
         HML 
    
1.377 1.680 1.812 1.403 
     
(2.740) (3.250) (3.510) (2.730) 
         Pricing Error  0.953 0.947 0.943 0.890 0.877 0.878 0.877 0.885 
 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2.7 
Fama MacBeth Regressions on 25 Size & Value and 10 Industry Portfolios 
The test assets are 25 Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios and 10 industry portfolios. The factor premia 
are estimated following Fama MacBeth cross-sectional procedure. There is no cross-sectional intercept.  
Pricing errors are the root mean squared errors with associated p-value are in the parenthesis for the 
hypothesis that all pricing errors are zero. Three-lag Newey-West t-statistics are in the parenthesis for 
factor premia estimates. Panel A presents unconditional estimates along with the Fama-French 3-factor 
model.  Panel B presents conditional models.  Sample 1964:Q1-2004:Q4.     
Panel A: Factor Premium of Unconditional and Fama-French 3-factor Models 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
INV -8.767 
  
     
 
(-2.430) 
  
     
         PF1 
 
0.505 
 
     
 
 
(3.050) 
 
     
         PF2 
  
0.381 
     
 
  
(2.950) 
     
         LEV 
   
0.426 
    
    
(3.200) 
    
         ASSET 
    
0.520 
   
     
(3.170) 
   
         EQUITY 
     
3.403 
  
      
(2.920) 
  
         MKT 
      
1.896 1.694 
       
(3.210) (2.980) 
         SMB 
       
0.524 
        
(1.250) 
         HML 
       
1.213 
        
(2.330) 
         Pricing Error 1.189 1.108 1.114 1.048 1.051 1.052 1.047 1.022 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2.7 continued 
 
Panel B: Factor Premium of Conditional Models 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
INV 4.009 
  
     
 
(2.600) 
  
     
         ASSET 0.824 
 
0.112 -0.561 -0.555 0.420 
  
 
(3.690) 
 
(0.680) (-1.940) (-1.950) (2.640) 
  
         PF1 
 
0.527 0.718 
     
  
(3.160) (3.130) 
     
         PF2 
 
0.648 -0.024 
     
  
(1.220) (-0.190) 
     
         EQUITY 
      
-0.004 1.842 
       
(-0.010) (2.540) 
         MKT 
   
1.463 1.589 
 
1.696 
 
    
(2.530) (2.760) 
 
(2.970) 
 
         SMB 
    
0.536 0.626 0.520 1.109 
     
(1.280) (1.510) (1.250) (2.640) 
         HML 
    
1.172 1.200 1.207 0.783 
     
(2.260) (2.310) (2.350) (1.500) 
         Pricing Error  1.107 1.102 1.095 1.037 1.018 1.023 1.019 1.035 
 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2.8 
Fama MacBeth Regressions on 25 Size & Value and 30 Industry Portfolios 
The test assets are 25 Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios and 30 industry portfolios.  Factors are 
described earlier. The factor premia are estimated following Fama MacBeth cross-sectional procedure. 
There is no cross-sectional intercept.  Pricing errors are the root mean squared errors with associated p-
value are in the parenthesis for the hypothesis that all pricing errors are zero. Three-lag Newey-West t-
statistics are in the parenthesis for factor premia estimates. Sample 1955:Q1-2009:Q4.     
 
  1 2 3 4 
ASSET 0.505 
  
0.453 
 
(3.060) 
  
(2.860) 
     MKT 
 
1.818 1.795 
 
  
(3.090) (3.190) 
 
     SMB 
  
0.296 0.479 
   
(0.690) (1.110) 
     HML 
  
0.643 0.579 
   
(1.200) (1.090) 
     Pricing Error 1.420 1.416 1.394 1.395 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Chapter 3 
 
Intermediation risk, firm productivity, and asset 
market liquidity  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In a recent paper, Brunnermeir and Pedersen (2009) argue that the funding liquidity and asset 
market liquidity are closely related.  Their model shows that traders provide market liquidity as 
long as traders have sufficient funding.  However, the Johnson (2009) model suggests that 
controlling for the aggregate financial position of the economy, there should not be any role for 
the financial position of securities dealers and brokerage firms (i.e., traders) in explaining 
aggregate fluctuations of overall market liquidity.  While investigating traders’ liquidity is 
important in the crisis management, studying the liquidity dynamics with a larger set of 
intermediaries has far more economic ramifications.  Since traders are involved dealing with 
marketable securities, their reach for assets in the economy is limited.  By contrast, 
intermediaries in aggregate enter into transactions that involve every conceivable asset in the 
economy.  To our knowledge, however, the existing literature does not investigate the market 
liquidity dynamics by considering the aggregate financial position of the economy.   
In this paper, we derive an intermediation-augmented investment-based asset pricing 
kernel to investigate the liquidity dynamics in the economy.  We build on Gomes et al. (2006) 
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who examines the asset pricing implications of firms’ financial constraints.  However, for the 
existing investment-based literature (e.g., Cochrane (1991, 1996), Gomes et al. (2006), among 
others), financial intermediation is exogenous.  The underlying assumption is that firms have 
access to external financing at some cost determined by the shadow costs of external funds, and 
that financially constrained firms relative to less constrained firms pay more for external funds.  
That is, the external funds supply is elastic.  We relax the standard assumption of the existing 
investment-based asset pricing models that firms have access to intermediated external funds by 
arguing that firms may not be able to raise any external fund if financial intermediaries are 
themselves constrained.  As a direct consequence, firm managers work under the uncertainty of 
external funds.  We show that the innovations in intermediaries’ funding produce time-series 
variations in investment returns, and hence the stochastic discount factor for stock returns is 
affine in intermediary funding shocks.  Next, we extend the results of Kyle (1985), who argues 
that information asymmetry between insiders and noise traders defines stock transaction 
liquidity, and show that stock liquidity is also a function of intermediary funding shocks.  This 
is the primary contribution of the paper.    
We measure intermediary funding shocks by the growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet 
variables, such as assets.  Next, we conduct stylized empirical tests to ascertain that 
intermediary funding shocks or intermediation factors behaves as state variables and explain 
stock liquidity. 
Following Merton (1973), Campbell (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a), and Santos 
and Veronesi (2006), among others, suggest that a state variable must forecast excess market 
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returns.  We show that intermediation factors forecast stock market returns, and thus behave as 
state variables.   
Merton (1980) further argues that the full story of the asset returns dynamics is revealed 
when innovations in higher moments of asset prices are investigated.  Since stock liquidity and 
stock volatility co-moves, investigating stock liquidity, in essence, allows for investigating 
higher moments of asset prices.  Furthermore, the existing literature (Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005), among others) finds that stock liquidity is a priced factor.  We show that intermediation 
factors not only explain stock liquidity but also raise questions about the evidence found in the 
existing literature that stock liquidity is a priced factor.    
Cochrane (1999) observes that macroeconomic factors are easier to motivate theoretically 
but none explains the value and size premium as well as Fama-French factors do.  The results in 
this paper show that intermediation factors explain the value and size premium.  To our 
knowledge, no other macro factor can explain the value and size premiums as well as 
intermediation factors do.   
A true factor must also explain the cross-section of stock returns, but this should be the 
final asset pricing test.  We find that investment-based (Cochrane, 1996), productivity-based 
(Balvers and Huang, 2007) and liquidity-based (Acharya and Pedersen (2005), among others) 
asset pricing factors that are known to explain the cross-section of stock returns perform poorly 
in predicting stock returns and/or explaining value and size premiums.  We conduct the cross-
sectional tests in a separate paper where we show that intermediations factors are indeed priced.   
The implications of our empirical results are as follows.  First, we contribute to the 
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market microstructure literature on liquidity in that we show that intermediaries’ funding is one 
of the determinants of stock liquidity.  Our study provides new evidence that time-varying 
market liquidity has the monetary liquidity component.  By showing that the commonality (see 
Chordia et al. (2001), among others) is embedded in intermediaries’ balance sheet shocks, our 
paper argues against the notion that the pricing of liquidity risk can be explained by the premium 
uninformed investors require for accommodating informed investors’ trades (O’Hara, 2003).     
Second, we show that the shadow price of external funds may not capture systematic 
intermediation risk.
22
  Stock portfolios formed on firm size are known to capture the level of 
firm financial constraints, and hence size-based stock portfolios indirectly capture the shadow 
price of external funds (see Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), 
Campello and Chen (2010), among others).  Our empirical results show that intermediation 
factors explain size-based stock portfolio returns, and that intermediation factor loadings for 
small stock returns are larger than that of large stock returns.   Hence, we argue that if 
intermediation risk were entirely captured in the shadow price of external funds, then 
intermediation factors would not have any explanatory power for size-based stock portfolio 
returns.  We further argue that in a bad state of the world, outrageous shadow prices of external 
funds would exclude firms from receiving any financing.
23
  Hence, intermediation risk and the 
shadow price of external funds are related but distinct issues. 
Third, the results in this paper pose considerable challenges to the notion that financial 
                                                 
22
 We thank an anonymous seminar participant at Universitat Pompeu Fabra to point out the issue that the shadow 
price of external funds may capture the intermediation risk. 
23
 We thank Pete Kyle for pointing it out.  For example, a highly constrained firm that is willing to pay 100% 
interests on borrowings will be immediately cutoff from external funding.  The reason is that it raises questions 
about the credibility of the firm.  
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frictions can be captured by the default premium, defined as the yield spread between Aaa and 
Baa rated corporate bonds.  Bernanke (1989), and Stock and Watson (1989, 1999) show that the 
default premium is one of the most powerful predictors for economic activities.  Gomes et al. 
(2006) further argue that the default premium captures aggregate financial frictions and that the 
shadow price of external funds is a linear function of the default premium.  We show that 
intermediation risk is more important than the default premium in predicting stock returns and in 
explaining value and size premiums.  Thus, the results suggest intermediation risk is another 
source of risk that may not be captured by the default premium.         
This paper is related to studies that investigate frictions in supplying credits.  On the 
microeconomic front, Q-theory based investments research has a long tradition in investigating 
the shadow price of external funds.
24
  On the macroeconomic front, there exists an extensive 
body of work that investigates financial frictions in supplying credit.  The existing literature 
(e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) study the effect of macroeconomic shocks and business cycles 
on firms’ demand for funding, and on firms’ ability to secure external financing.  The central 
thread that connects both the macroeconomic and microeconomic research is that financial 
imperfections lead firms to react heterogeneously, and that frictions such as asymmetric 
information often play a significant role in determining the supply of credits.   
 Intriguingly, investigating the role of financial intermediaries in supplying credits in a 
financially imperfect world is relatively rare.  Within microeconomic research, intermediaries’ 
funding is exogenous and firms’ financial constraints are evaluated by considering firm-level 
                                                 
24
 A partial list includes Hennessy and Whited (2006) and Hennessy (2004).   
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financial variables.  However, irrespective of whether firms are financially constrained or not, 
firms rely on intermediaries for external funds.  Given a set of investment opportunities, a value 
maximizing manager would optimally choose internal and external funds.
25
  However, the 
existing investment-based asset pricing literature does not answer two important questions.  Are 
optimally chosen external funds available at any given instant?  How do fluctuations in external 
financing affect firm investments decisions, and hence affect investment returns?  We answer 
these questions by incorporating intermediaries’ funding constraints into the firm value 
optimization problem.   
The paper is related to studies (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), among others) that 
investigate the effect of capital constraints of firms and intermediaries on investments.  The 
paper is also related to recent studies that derive asset prices in the presence of intermediaries, 
such as the models of He and Krishnamurthy (2011 and 2012) and Brunnermeir and Sannikov 
(2011).  However, these studies do not investigate whether fluctuations of intermediaries’ 
wealth can explain stock liquidity or predict stock returns.   
Adrian et al. (2012) consider an ad hoc stochastic discount factor for excess returns that is 
affine in brokers and dealers’ leverage shocks.  However, they observe that they cannot provide 
any theoretical justification for their empirical findings.  We provide a plausible theoretical 
foundation for the empirical results of Adrian et al. (2012).  Importantly, the model presented 
here shows that the empirical model of Adrian et al. (2012) is a special case of a general asset 
pricing model.    
                                                 
25
 While internal funds are important (see, Rajan and Zingales (1995)) in financing projects, firm capital structure 
depends also on external funds.  
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The essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model that shows the 
relationship between asset liquidity and the investment-based stochastic discount factor.  
Section 3.3 describes data.  Section 3.4 presents the empirical results.  Section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2 The model 
The model builds on the essay 2 of this dissertation and the existing investment-based asset 
pricing models.
26
  I use results of essay 2 as given and argue that the stochastic discount factor 
that defines asset prices also defines asset liquidity. What follows from essay 2 is that the 
intermediation-augmented investment-based stochastic discount factor can be written as  
M𝑡+1 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑡+1
1 ++𝛽2𝑓𝑡+1
2        (1)  
where  𝑓𝑡+1
1  is measured by either invest returns or productivity factors of BH and  𝑓𝑡+1
2  is 
measured by the growth of intermediaries’ balance sheet variables.  
 
3.2.1 Stock liquidity 
One of the other testable implications of equation (1) is to test whether financial intermediaries’ 
funding determines stock liquidity.  The motivation is that higher moments of stock returns may 
provide alternative explanations for the stock returns dynamics.  A full story of the asset returns 
dynamics is revealed when innovations in higher moments of asset prices are investigated 
(Merton, 1980).  Johnson (2008) further notes the contemporaneous nature of volatility and 
liquidity by arguing, “Intuitively, even in more general economics, anything that causes asset 
                                                 
26
 An incomplete list includes Cochrane (1991, 1996); Livdan et al. (2009); Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009); and 
Gomes et al. (2006). 
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risk to rise will steepen the demand curves.”  Hence, the co-movements of stock liquidity and 
stock volatility make stock liquidity a prime candidate for investigating the stock returns 
dynamics. 
The true value of firms, and hence the fundamental value of stocks, which is a claim on 
firms’ assets, is unobservable.  The degree of fluctuations from the true value is the liquidity of 
stocks, and it represents the ease with which stocks are traded with less impact on prices; the 
lower (higher) is the deviation, the higher (lower) is the liquidity.  Since securities’ liquidity has 
different explanations, such as search cost, inventory costs, information asymmetry etc., no 
model can accurately capture every dimension of stock liquidity.  Following the information 
asymmetry-based explanation for stock liquidity à la Kyle (1985), we illustrate how stock price 
dispersion is related to stock liquidity.  
Assume firm stocks are traded in a market in the Kyle (1985) world, where there are three 
types of economic agents: an insider (informed traders), a noise trader (uninformed or liquidity 
traders), and a market maker.  The informed trader knows the true value of the firm given by 
equation (1), and its distribution ?̃? ∼ 𝑁(𝜇𝑉, 𝜎𝑉), where 𝜇𝑉 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑉 are the mean and variance of 
the firm value process.  That is, among other things, informed traders know firms’ sources of 
internal and external funds, and hence know firm productivity innovations represented by 
equation (6).  As a direct consequence, informed traders know both the impact of firm external 
funds on the stochastic discount factor given by equation (10) and the distribution of the firm 
value process.
27
  The informed trader trades to maximize profits by camouflaging his trades 
                                                 
27
 Equation (10) implies that the firm value follows 𝐸𝑡[𝑀𝑡+1𝑉𝑡+1] = 𝑉𝑡 .    
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with the trades of the noise trader.  The noise trader trades an exogenous amount distributed 
according to ?̃? ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑈), where ?̃? is uncorrelated with ?̃?.  The market maker observes the 
order flow (from both informed and noise traders) but cannot distinguish between the two trades, 
and hence the market maker sets the stock price equal to the expected firm value conditional on 
the observed order flow.  In equilibrium, the market maker uses a linear price function that has 
a slope of Kyle’s (1995) Lambda (Λ), which measures the price impact per dollar of order flow, 
and hence Λ captures the liquidity of traded stocks.  Using Kyle’s (1985) results we write    
 Λ =
1
2
(𝜎𝑉 𝜎𝑈⁄ )         (2)  
However, in Kyle’s (1985) model, 𝜎𝑉 is exogenous, that is, the sources in the fluctuations 
of firm value are not explicitly defined.  We argue that 𝜎𝑉  is driven by economic fundamentals 
as shown in equation (6).  Two stocks may have the same 𝜎𝑈, but 𝜎𝑉 could be different, and 
hence they have different liquidity.  To be specific, firms that are exposed to volatile external 
funding have volatile productivity, and hence traded securities of these firms are less liquid 
relative to that for firms that have stable sources of external funds.  On the contrary, if two 
stocks have the same 𝜎𝑉 , but have different 𝜎𝑈, then two stocks will have different liquidity and 
information asymmetry solely drives stock liquidity.  It is intuitive that by observing Λ, one 
cannot disentangle whether it is determined by 𝜎𝑉 or  𝜎𝑈 .  However, one can definitely 
investigate whether Λ can be explained by intermediaries’ funding shocks.  One can also 
investigate the impact of 𝜎𝑉 on stock liquidity.  For larger firms, 𝜎𝑉 is likely to be lower 
because the firm value process is less sensitive to intermediation risk.  
For parsimony, we do not formally derive the relationship between Λ and intermediaries’ 
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funding shocks because such a derivation does not add anything beyond the firm value process 
captured by the relationship (6).  Instead, starting from the liquidity measurement from stock 
returns, described in the next sub-section, we provide intermediation-based explanation of stock 
liquidity.   
 
3.2.2 Stock Liquidity Proxies 
Having discussed how stock returns can be measured in terms intermediaries’ balance sheet 
shocks; we next discuss stock liquidity measures.  We use three liquidity proxies to capture 
stock liquidity.  Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (ILR) measure, which is based on the price impact to 
the order flow and is the empirical analog for Kyle’s Λ, is calculated as the ratio of the price 
movement to the trading volume: 
 ILR𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑖,𝑑,𝑡|
(𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑,𝑡)
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑=1          (3)   
where, |𝑅𝑖,𝑑,𝑡| and 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑑,𝑡 are the absolute return and the dollar volume of security i on date d. 
It is customary to multiply ILR by 106.    𝐼𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 measures the effect on returns for a given trading 
volume, and the ILR measure could be viewed as a scaled version of return volatility.  For a 
given trading volume of securities, the higher is the deviation of returns from the mean, the lower 
is the liquidity.  Since Equation (11) shows that a portion of stock return variations are tied to 
the variations in external funding relative to capital, we argue that ILR, in essence, is partially 
determined by intermediary’s funding.   
The second measure is the liquidity measure of Roll (1984) which is a canonical model of 
the dealer market with fixed cost and it is an estimate of the implicit spread. The variations of 
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this model are present, in disguise, throughout the market-microstructure literature.  Under the 
assumption that there exists a constant effective spread, the liquidity of a stock ‘i’ is captured by  
 Roll𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∑ √−𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑑,𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑑,𝑡−1)
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑=1        (4)   
where, 𝑅𝑖,𝑑,𝑡 is stock returns, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the number of days.  ROLL, in essence, measures stock 
return dispersions.  As a direct consequence, we argue that ROLL is determined by the 
innovations in intermediaries funding.   
We use the third measure to conduct robustness checks.  The relative spread measure of 
stock liquidity is based on the trading cost, and is calculated as the ratio of the bid-ask spread to 
the midpoint price of a security and is calculated as:  
 RS𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∑
(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑠𝑘−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑖𝑑)𝑖,𝑑,𝑡
(0.5𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐 
𝑏𝑖𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡+0.5𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡)𝑖,𝑑,𝑡
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑=1     (5)   
Where D is number of trading days, d is the day when bid and ask of security ‘i’ is calculated. 
The liquidity of a portfolio is calculated by averaging liquidity proxies over the number 
of NYSE stocks in a portfolio. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Amihud, 2002) we consider 
stocks with share price more than $5 and less than $1000.   
We first calculate liquidity of each stock based on ILR, RS, and ROLL. Next, we 
calculate equally weighted average of liquidity of all stocks to get a measure of stock market 
liquidity, which we denote as ILR, RS, and ROLL for parsimony.  Note that each liquidity 
measure proxy for stock illiquidity.  
We also investigate the dynamics with liquidity of stocks of different sizes for robustness 
checks.  We form three stock portfolios with stocks ranked on market capitalization (size) into 
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treciles, and then calculate liquidity of each portfolios.  If ILR is the liquidity proxy, liquidity of 
stock based on size are denoted as ILR_Small, ILR_Mid, and ILR_Large.   
 
3.3. Data 
The quarterly-sample under investigation dates from the first quarter of 1955 to the fourth 
quarter of 2009.  Unless noted otherwise, all data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.  Intermediaries’ balance sheet data is obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds.  
The balance sheet data at the Federal Flow of Funds are reported at the subsidiary level, and 
hence any possibility of double counting is eliminated.  Following Adrian and Shin (2009), we 
include 17 intermediaries to proxy for the U.S. financial intermediation, and these intermediaries 
are grouped into six categories: banks, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
securities brokers & dealers, and shadow-banks.
28
  Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics 
for these intermediaries.  For the subsequent analysis, we aggregate intermediaries’ balance 
sheet data, and following balance sheet variables are used: assets, liabilities,  equity =
(assets − liabilities),and leverage, where leverage is defined as leverage = (assets equity).⁄   
Intermediation factors are the growth of the above four variables. 
We obtain stock returns, risk free (T-bills) rates, and 25 Fama-French size and book-to-
market portfolio returns data from Ken French’s website.  To calculate stock market liquidity, 
we obtain NYSE stocks data from CRSP.  Investments data are obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  cay, the consumption to wealth ratio of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) is 
                                                 
28 See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010) for more details about shadow banking. 
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obtained from Martin Lettau’s website.  Productivity shocks data is obtained from Ronald 
Balvers’s website.   
We get consistent intermediation data from the first quarter of 1951.  However, to 
account for the initial data reporting errors, we discard data from 1951 to 1954.  As a result, the 
final sample is from 1955 through 2009.  Since we have access to productivity shocks data from 
1964 through 2004, when productivity shocks are used for the analysis we use the above sub-
sample.  The sub-sample analysis allows for additional robustness checks.  
We use three control variables.  The term-spread (referred to as TERM), calculated as 
the difference between the yield on the 3-month Treasury-bill and the yield on a 10-year Treasury 
bond index, is included to capture the uncertainties in the Treasury bond market.  The literature 
(e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) further suggests that financial frictions can be captured by the 
default premium (referred to as CREDIT), the difference between the yields on 10 year Aaa and 
Baa rated corporate bonds, and hence we use CREDIT as an additional control.  
   Since stock liquidity and stock volatility commove, volatility of NYSE stocks 
(referred to as VOL) is used as a control whenever we use stock liquidity in the analysis.   
 
3.3.1 Characteristics of data 
We conduct ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller, 1979) unit-root tests in conjunction with KPPS 
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) stationarity tests to ascertain stationarity of data.  We find that ILR is 
trend-stationary, with a statistically significant downward sloping trend.  Since the stock trading 
volume, which is in the denominator of the ILR measure, has been steadily rising across stocks, 
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ILR has been contracting for years.   As a direct consequence, ILR has a downward sloping 
trend.  To maintain the data integrity, we remove both the drift and linear trend to get detrended 
ILR data, and find that the detrended ILR is stationary.  As for the rest of the data, CREDIT is 
the only variable that is not stationary for the whole sample, and we take the first difference to 
attain stationarity.   
 
3.4. Main results 
The results show that intermediation factors predict stock liquidity, and hence conform to the 
model prediction that the stochastic discount factor explains asset liquidity.  While productivity 
is important, productivity factors lose their predictive power for asset liquidity in the presence of 
intermediation factors.   
  
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 Panel A presents the summary statistics for stock liquidity measures.  We have four 
sets of data for each stock liquidity proxy: liquidity of small, mid, and large size stocks and the 
aggregated liquidity of all stocks.  Table 1 Panel B presents the sample correlation. The results 
show intermediation-based factors are negatively correlated with stock liquidity proxies and is 
consistent with the liquidity measures all of which measure ‘illiquidity’.  That is, positive 
intermediation stocks improve stock liquidity.  Since the univariate relationship may not hold in 
the presence of controls that are known to affect stock liquidity, we next investigate the 
relationship in a comprehensive manner.      
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3.4.2 Predicting Stock Liquidity 
We run a predictive regression to investigate the relation between stock liquidity and 
intermediation factors.  
 𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛾𝑡𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡      (6) 
where Y is stock liquidity, we use lags of Y on the right-hand of the regression equation to 
whiten Y, one lag of Z is the explanatory variable, and K is the vector of control variables.  In 
addition to the controls variables used earlier, we use volatility of NYSE stocks (VOL) since 
stock volatility and liquidity co-move.  Additionally, we control for recessions and the recent 
crisis.    
Looking from the left in Table 3.2 Panel A, first we present the result for the full sample 
with ASSET as the primary explanatory variable.  The results show ASSET predicts ILR and 
adding INVEST as an additional variable does not change the result qualitatively.  Most 
importantly, INVEST has no predictive power for ILR.  Since ILR measures illiquidity, the sign 
of the coefficient of ASSET is negative.  The results thus indicate that in explaining stock 
liquidity ASSET is the primary variable.  The sub-sample analysis, where we control for 
recessions or the recent crisis, shows ASSET remains important.  The last six columns show 
that alternate measures for stock liquidity do not change the results. 
 Looking next at Table 3.2 Panel B, we observe that by considering ILR of different sizes 
the results hold.  However, we see the impact of ASSET is different across liquidity of stock 
portfolios, and the impact of ASSET on liquidity of small stocks is the largest.  Thus, the results 
capture the volatility of firm value process (𝜎𝑉 of equation (12)) across different stock sizes.  
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Since large stocks are likely to be least affected by intermediation risk, and hence the firm value 
process is least sensitive to intermediation risk.  As a result, large stock liquidity is least 
sensitive to ASSET.  While information asymmetry may be one of the reasons for why some 
stocks are more liquid than others, the explanation above does not depend on information 
asymmetry.   
Note that Kyle’s Λ =
1
2
(𝜎𝑉 𝜎𝑈⁄ ) measured across stocks are necessarily measuring the 
level of information asymmetry.  Small stocks are less liquid (see Table 3.1 Panel C), that is, Λ 
is large, because 𝜎𝑈 is small relative to 𝜎𝑉.  If 𝜎𝑈 alone drives stock liquidity, then ASSET 
should not have any explanatory power for ILR, which is inverse of Λ.  However, we observe 
that ASSET is inversely proportional to ILR, that is, ASSET measures 𝜎𝑉.  If the contribution of 
ASSET on Λ is larger than that of 𝜎𝑈, then uninformed traders may not ask for the liquidity risk 
they are bearing.         
The results hold for the subsequent sub-sample analysis.  For parsimony, we do not 
report the results where the primary explanatory variables are EQUITY or LEV since the results 
are similar.  We also do not report the results for other measures of stock liquidity since the 
results are not qualitatively different from the results for ILR.  
Table 3.2 Panel C shows the regression results where we control for BH productivity 
factors.  Since BH productivity factors data is available for 1964 through 2004, the results allow 
for additional robustness checks.  Looking from the left, first we present the results with 
ASSET as the primary explanatory variable.  The results show ASSET predicts ILR_Small, and 
augmenting the model with PF1 and PF2 as additional variables does not change the result 
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qualitatively.  As for productivity factors, unconditional productivity factor PF1 predicts 
ILR_Small.  Controlling for recessions has minimal effect on both ASSET and PF1.   
Looking next for the results in the next six columns show that both ASSET and PF1 
predicts ILR_Mid.  As for ILR_Large, the predictive power of both ASSET and PF1 is not as 
robust as that for ILR_Small and ILR_Mid.  That is, the results suggest that larger firms are less 
affected by systematic intermediation or productivity shocks. 
Looking at the last column, the results, however, show that ASSET better predicts overall 
stock market liquidity even after controlling for recessions.  By contrast, productivity factors 
have no predictive power for overall stock market liquidity. 
In summary, the results suggest that intermediation factors are more important than 
investment-based or productivity-based factors in explaining stock market liquidity.     
 
3.4.3 Economic Interpretations 
Why do intermediation factors predict stock returns and liquidity well?  The answer to the 
question rests both on the relationship among intermediaries’ balance sheet variables and on the 
relationship between intermediaries and firms.  We first investigate how intermediaries’ balance 
sheet variables interact with each other with the business cycle.  Next, we relate the evolution of 
intermediaries’ balance sheets to firm characteristics.  
Adrian and Shin (2010) discuss the relationship between intermediaries’ equity and 
leverage and its implication on intermediaries’ balance sheets.   They show commercial banks 
target a preset leverage and investment banks’ leverage is procyclical.   As asset prices rise, 
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intermediaries’ equity rises, thereby lowering the leverage.  Commercial banks respond to the 
falling leverage by expanding the balance sheet by borrowing and lending more to revert back to 
the desired leverage.  The effect of asset prices on investment banks’ balance sheets is more 
pronounced since their leverage is procyclical.  Investment banks borrow and lend more than 
commercial banks and their leverage keep rising with the rising asset prices until an asset price 
bubble sets in.       
By contrast, we show intermediaries’ leverage in aggregate is procyclical.  In Figure 
2.2, we show the relationship between intermediaries’ asset and leverage growths.  The positive 
slope of the regression line implies that intermediaries’ leverage is procyclical.  As a direct 
consequence, in economic expansions (recessions) when asset prices are high (low) 
intermediaries expand (contract) the balance sheet 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The Brunnermeir and Pedersen (2009) model shows that the funding liquidity and asset market 
liquidity are intimately related: traders provide market liquidity as long as traders have sufficient 
funding in crisis periods.  By contrast, the Johnson (2009) model suggests that controlling for 
the aggregate financial position of the economy, there should not be any role for the financial 
position of securities dealers and brokerage firms in explaining aggregate fluctuations of overall 
market liquidity.  The implication of the above studies is that while investigating traders’ 
liquidity is important in the crisis management, studying the market liquidity dynamics with a 
larger set of intermediaries has far more economic ramifications.  The reason is that while 
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traders are involved dealing with marketable securities, the aggregated financial position of 
intermediaries encompasses every conceivable asset in the economy.  Hence, investigating the 
role of aggregated financial position of intermediaries in determining the market liquidity is 
important.  In this paper, we develop a model to show how the growth of intermediaries’ 
financial position explains the aggregated market liquidity.  This is the primary contribution of 
the paper.  
We further address the shortcomings of the existing investment-based asset pricing 
models, such as Cochrane’s (1991 and 1996), that assume financial intermediation is exogenous 
to the firm value maximization problem.  We relax the assumption that firms have 
intermediated lines of credit at some cost, and show that fluctuations in intermediaries’ funding 
a) is a factor for stock returns, and b) can explain stock liquidity. 
We contribute to the market microstructure literature on liquidity in that we show that 
intermediaries’ funding shocks are one of the determinants of stock liquidity.  That is, we show 
that the commonality in stock liquidity is determined by intermediaries’ balance sheet shocks.    
We contribute to the asset pricing literature by showing that the exiting investment-based 
asset pricing models, such as Cochrane’s (1991 and 1996), are a special case of a general asset 
pricing kernel.  The intermediation-augmented investment-based model predicts that the 
marginal funding that intermediaries provide explains stock returns.  The empirical results 
suggest that intermediation factors outweigh existing investment- and productivity-based factors 
in predicting stock returns and stock liquidity.   
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We find that investment-based (Cochrane, 1996), productivity-based (Balvers and Huang, 
2007) and liquidity-based (Acharya and Pedersen (2005), among others) asset pricing factors that 
are known to explain the cross-section of stock returns perform poorly in predicting stock returns.  
By contrast, intermediation factors predict stock returns and stock liquidity.  Thus, 
intermediation factors behave as a true state variable in the economy.  As a natural extension, 
future research may investigate the cross-sectional asset pricing implications of intermediation 
factors.  We leave this task for future research.       
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Table 3.1 
Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for stock liquidity Panel A presents the statistics for stock liquidity for NYSE 
stocks, where ILR (Amihud, 2002), RS, and ROLL (Roll, 1984) are stock liquidity measures.  Stock portfolios are 
constructed by allocating stocks into treciles (Small, Mid, and Large) formed on market capitalization (size) and 
corresponding liquidity of stock portfolios are measured. Panel B shows the correlation between ASSET, INVEST, 
PF1 and PF2 with ILR, ROLL and RS. 
 
Panel A: Stock Liquidity measures  
  ROLL_Small ROLL_Mid ROLL_Large ROLL ILR_Small ILR_Mid ILR_Large ILR RS_Small RS_Mid RS_Large RS 
Mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.15 0.20 0.03 0.42 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Median 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.66 0.11 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Std. dev. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.24 0.40 0.03 0.43 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Min 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Max 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 7.12 4.41 0.13 1.90 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
N (Obs) 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation of ASSET, competing factors and stock liquidity 
 
INVEST PF1 PF2 ASSET ILR ROLL 
PF1 -0.200 
     PF2 -0.145 0.331 
    ASSET 0.119 0.138 0.137 
   ILR -0.374 -0.060 -0.068 -0.230 
  ROLL -0.287 -0.061 0.014 -0.286 0.342 
 RS -0.248 -0.044 0.029 -0.259 0.251 0.976 
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Table 3.2 
Predicting Stock Liquidity 
The table shows the results of the regression equation  𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛾𝑡𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, where Y is the 
dependent variable, which represents one of the portfolios stock liquidity, Z is ASSET, the asset growth of 
intermediaries; K is the vector of control variables: VOL, TERM, and CREDIT, where VOL is the volatility of 
NYSE stocks.  Panel B presents the results for the whole sample (1955-2009), and the results after controlling for 
INVEST, recessions, and the recent crisis.  Panel C presents the results for liquidity of stocks of different sizes. 
Panel C presents the results for liquidity of stocks of different sizes after controlling for productivity factors: PF1 
and PF2, and recessions.  Errors are corrected for Newey-West heteroscedasticy adjustments. T-statistics are in the 
parenthesis.  The indicator is one if recessions or the recent crisis. 
 
Panel A: Predicting Stock Liquidity by Intermediaries' Asset Growth and Investment Returns 
Dependent Variable: Stock Liquidity   
      
 
ILR ROLL RS 
Sample Period 1955-2009 
Recession 
versus 
Non-
recession 
Crisis 
versus 
Non-
crisis 
1955-2009 
Recession 
versus 
Non-
recession 
Crisis 
versus 
Non-
crisis 
1955-2009 
Recession 
versus 
Non-
recession 
Crisis 
versus 
Non-
crisis 
ASSET -0.68 -0.61 -0.64 -0.68 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
 
(-3.46) (-2.91) (-3.13) (-3.48) (-1.98) (-0.93) (-2.02) (-2.09) (-3.34) (-2.12) 
INVEST 0.03 0.12 0.00   -0.05 0.08   -0.13 -0.01 
  
(0.29) (0.26) (-0.29)   (-1.16) (0.66)   (-0.98) (-0.08) 
Indicator* ASSET 
 
0.12 0.00   -0.05 0.08   -0.13 -0.01 
   
(0.26) (-0.29)   (-1.16) (0.66)   (-0.98) (-0.08) 
Indicator 
  
0.01 -0.20   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.01 
   
(0.96) (-0.58)   (3.30) (2.41)   (3.39) (2.63) 
TERM 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.58) (-0.66) (0.99) (0.61) (-0.01) (1.00) (0.90) (0.09) (0.78) (1.00) 
CREDIT -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(-1.57) (-1.86) (-1.88) (-1.29) (0.07) (-0.82) (-1.09) (-0.12) (-0.50) (-1.11) 
VOL 1.14 1.88 1.08 1.28 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.07 
 
(1.83) (2.19) (1.54) (2.01) (0.04) (-0.01) (-0.50) (0.16) (0.04) (-0.54) 
N (Obs) 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Adj. R-Squared 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.22 0.26 0.24 
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Table 3.2 continued 
 
Panel B: Predicting Liquidity of Stocks of Different Sizes by Intermediaries' Asset Growth 
Dependent Variable: Stock Liquidity   
      
 
ILR_Small ILR_Mid ILR_Large 
Sample Period 1955-2009 
Recession 
versus 
Non-
recession 
Crisis 
versus 
Non-
crisis 
1955-2009 
Recession 
versus 
Non-
recession 
Crisis 
versus 
Non-
crisis 
1955-2009 
Recession 
versus 
Non-
recession 
Crisis 
versus 
Non-
crisis 
ASSET -1.68 -1.64 -1.80 -0.19 -0.14 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
(-3.21) (-2.97) (-3.32) (-2.30) (-1.63) (-1.69) (-3.06) (-2.22) (-2.90) 
Indicator* ASSET 0.73 1.44   -0.24 -0.39   -0.02 0.00 
  
(0.64) (1.11)   (-1.42) (-2.27)   (-0.75) (0.07) 
Indicator 
 
0.02 -0.02   0.01 0.01   0.00 0.00 
  
(0.76) (-0.79)   (1.78) (2.34)   (0.87) (0.05) 
TERM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.32) (0.71) (0.49) (1.11) (1.68) (1.24) (0.85) (1.16) (0.66) 
CREDIT -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(-1.63) (-1.96) (-1.30) (-1.33) (-1.67) (-1.88) (-1.05) (-1.30) (-0.89) 
VOL 3.03 3.03 3.53 0.54 0.40 0.39 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
(1.81) (1.71) (2.16) (1.88) (1.27) (1.28) (0.52) (0.35) (0.43) 
N (Obs) 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Adj. R-Squared 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.24 0.24 0.23 
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Table 3.2 continued 
 
Panel C: Predicting Liquidity of Stocks of Different Sizes by Intermediaries' Asset Growth and Productivity Factors  
Dependent Variable: Stock Liquidity               
 
ILR_Small ILR_Mid ILR_Large ILR 
Sample Period 1964-2004 
Recession 
versus Non-
recession 
1964-2004 
Recession 
versus Non-
recession 
1964-2004 
Recession 
versus Non-
recession 
Recession 
versus Non-
recession 
ASSET -4.29 -3.96 -2.55 -0.54 -0.48 -0.30 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.96 
 (-3.46) (-3.05) (-2.34) (-3.38) (-2.90) (-2.11) (-1.89) (-1.55) (-0.69) (-2.34) 
PF1 -5.66 -3.34   -0.81 -0.55   -0.08 -0.05 -1.31 
  (-2.13) (-1.23) 
  (-2.74) (-2.00)   (-1.43) (-0.72) (-1.31) 
PF2 -4.24 -1.10   -0.99 -0.62   -0.26 -0.20 -0.64 
  (-0.60) (-0.18) 
  (-1.02) (-0.74)   (-1.71) (-1.44) (-0.27) 
Indicator* ASSET 
 2.82 
  
 0.20 
  
 -0.02 1.00 
   (0.58) 
  
 (0.33) 
  
 (-0.19) (0.54) 
Indicator 
  0.23 
  
 0.03 
  
 0.01 0.09 
   (1.67) 
  
 (1.79) 
  
 (1.57) (1.69) 
TERM -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-1.57) (-1.26) (0.54) (-2.28) (-1.98) (-0.38) (-1.98) (-1.78) (-0.78) (0.41) 
CREDIT 0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.41) (0.94) (-1.58) (-0.94) (-0.510 (-2.92) (-0.55) (-0.08) (-1.22) (-1.79) 
VOL 17.18 15.92 14.59 1.83 1.64 1.46 0.28 0.25 0.22 5.42 
 (2.36) (2.32) (2.74) (2.69) (2.67) (3.31) (1.94) (1.87) (2.00) (2.84) 
N (Obs) 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 
Adj. R-Squared 0.20 0.23 0.34 0.21 0.26 0.36 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.35 
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